In the absence of consensus, risk managers have to look beyond their own diagnosis and adopt a second-order approach, taking into account the different perceptions and diagnoses of the various actors observing a situation. This second-order approach stems from a relativization that allows us to tend towards a consensus, but it is important to remember or clarify that it is not without limits. It goes without saying that first-order analysis can sometimes lead to a direct and undeniable observation of a real fact that clashes head-on with the discourse of a given actor: in this precise case, the analysis must not hesitate to give precedence to this first-order observation within a second-order analysis. This stance is not without risk, but it is prophylactic in a world where reality is becoming secondary.
The scarcity of consensus calls for relativized approaches
In the best of all possible worlds, prevention consists in transforming a situation to reduce vulnerabilities and build resilience, and the transformation to be carried out is agreed by consensus. In practice, this consensus often does not exist: everyone wants a different transformation, and a transformation considered beneficial by one may be considered harmful by another. This leads us to consider not one situation, but a set of situations observed in different ways, and of possibly antagonistic desired transformations. This is what Relativized Cindynics call a ‘spectrum’ of relative situations: both perspectives (i.e. perceptions of a real situation), and “prospectives” (i.e. ideal situations), are relative, or subjective.
Strategic vision is based on understanding others
This relativization leads to so-called “second-order” models, since the analysis observes not a system of actors (which would be a “first-order” observation), but a system of observers: a spectrum of relative situations is no more and no less than a strategic vision of the observers present, of the different transformations desired, planned or underway, and of the different perceptions underlying these transformations. Second-order reasoning requires the ability to put oneself in the other's shoes, to understand them, and the failure to do so is a weakness. This other is not necessarily an enemy: while it is often said “know your enemy as yourself”, the Art of War more precisely says “know the other, know yourself”. Putting oneself in the other's shoes also means giving oneself the opportunity to realize that he or she can become an ally, and this is the foundation of consensus-building and conflict reduction.
Relativization is limited by observation
This process of relativization leads to an understanding of points of view, and, for example, to taking into account differences in values: most often, values specific to a culture are compatible with universal values, but sometimes they are not, for example when they clash head-on with gender equality or freedom of conscience. Similarly, different observers have different ways of looking at reality: they don't necessarily observe the same topology of actors, or use the same scales of analysis, or observe the same aspects of a problem. All these differences surface when analyzing available sources or through direct dialogue with the actors. But while it is necessary to take into account all these relative perceptions of reality, which means putting aside any possible bias, it can happen that direct observation of a situation shows without the slightest doubt that a given actor's description of reality is not compatible with the facts. This is constantly observed in the field of perception warfare, but also frequently in other fields.
Reality prophylaxis: taking the risk of speaking hard truths.
For example, in the context of a freeway project, actors complain of a lack of connectivity, but direct observation shows that existing roads are in fact under-used. Or a report states that, in the case of cerebral malaria (a severe form of malaria with three stages: convulsions, coma, death), anti-malarial drugs are free in a given African country. But in the field, you observe that when a young girl is admitted to the emergency room for cerebral malaria, the first thing the parents are asked to do while she is convulsing is to pay 20,000 CFA, which they don't have. The relativization of perceptions stops there, when confronted with an observed, undeniable reality that must be stated: in this case, this first-order observation must take precedence over the second-order approach. In other words, the analyst must not only describe a simple perception disparity between himself and another observer, but also show that the latter's discourse is obviously not compatible with the facts, which, incidentally, could be variously appreciated. This entails a reputational risk for the risk manager or cindynician – and that's what gives their discipline its flavor – but in the age of post-truth, even if it means taking a risk, this prophylactic approach has become a necessity.