Two of the main threats of the coming decades are global warming and the manipulation of perceptions, which is the informational component of hybrid warfare. The Cartesian mindset tends to see these threats as independent of each other. The concomitance of Russian information operations and the A69 freeway project illustrates why this is not the case.
In the field of information, it should be noted that French institutions have been late to appreciate the strategic importance of Russian information operations, particularly in Africa: for several years, they failed to hear, listen to or understand repeated warnings. The consequences of this institutional incapacity were the end of Operation Barkhane, the installation of military juntas, and a deteriorating security situation whose first victims are the Sahelian populations. The historical responsibility for this geopolitical defeat and humanitarian disaster is therefore primarily institutional, and can be explained by the lack of conceptual tools and offensive operational experience in the field of perception warfare in cyberspace.
The A69 project is highly controversial: the result of an influence campaign waged by Castres-based actors for decades, it generates strong opposition, mainly because it predates the Paris agreements and the massive awareness of climate risk. Basically, while relativizing the perceptions of the various actors, intellectual honesty compels us to recognize that, despite the pro-A69 rhetoric, the Castres area is not economically lagging behind (as demonstrated by INSEE), and there is no enclavement in the sense that direct observation shows that traffic on the A680 and D20 segments, which need to be upgraded to 2x2 lanes to be integrated into the A69, is virtually nil (a few vehicles per minute, at most). To invoke a notion of major interest is, under these conditions, unfounded. Worse still, this argument ignores a strategic threat which, for its part, is truly major.
Following the invalidation of the prefectoral authorizations, which led to the suspension of the work, a bill designed to circumvent this suspension is being examined in parliament, and the administrative court has authorized the resumption of the work: the consequence of this escalation is a growing divergence between citizens, and in particular the new generations, who are more aware of the global warming they will have to survive, and the political decision-makers of the boomer generation.
Meanwhile, even though France is a nuclear power, the rise of Russian neo-imperialism means that we need to build up a conventional deterrent after decades of reduced military power. Beyond the industrial aspects, building this deterrent depends in particular on recruiting young people. Recruitment can be difficult, as can be seen in Great Britain, for example. In France, this could also be the case: and it will be all the more so as political decisions widen the gap between the powers and the younger generation. How can we hope to convince young people that France needs them if, at the same time, public authorities are condemning their future with anachronistic projects that they perceive as ecocidal and climatically destructive?
At the very least, institutional ductability to influence campaigns led by special interests promoting projects that are anachronistic and incompatible with environmental protection and the fight against global warming can only lead to societal divergences that will undermine the ability to build a conventional deterrent.
But: the political construction of these societal divergences can only fuel Russian destabilization operations. While Russian disinformation is characterized by ludicrous rhetoric aimed at populations with strong ductability, in practice it feeds on existing divergences, which it can easily exacerbate. Here again, this warning could be disregarded, but feedback from Barkhane's geopolitical defeat shows that this would be an imprudent move.
To counter this threat, we need to reduce societal divergences, and at the very least, avoid generating them. To preserve France's ability to build a conventional deterrent, in the case of the A69, the most reasonable option is to accept to take its losses and put an end to a backward and objectively unfounded freeway project. Alternatively, there would be only two alternatives: mass manipulation of the new generations, or forced enlistment, but while such processes can be observed in some countries, they don't seem compatible with French values.