Toppling the Iranian regime is both an ethical and strategic necessity and, regardless of what may be said, constitutes the only rational war objective for the Israeli-U.S. coalition. An analysis based on the three levels of cindynic modeling helps clarify, in a structured manner, the decisive factors that determine whether a mobilization aimed at this regime change can be triggered, as well as its chances of success.
When Idealism and Realism meet
The Iranian people can only regain their fundamental rights through a regime change, which is, moreover, the only way to ensure a lasting dismantling of Iran’s military nuclear program. Consequently, if this regime were to remain in power, the United States would have suffered a defeat. The question of the possibility of regime change is therefore crucial and a top priority, and can be examined across three levels or “orders” of analysis.
First level: Situation analysis
My perception of the actual situation (my perspective) is that the Iranian theocracy does not respect fundamental rights. This represents a major deficit in relation to my assessment of the ideal situation (my Prospective) which requires a transformation: the overthrow of the regime. This first level of analysis, corresponding to so-called “first-order” cindynic models, can only be used if there is consensus among actors, for example in risk and disaster prevention, while noting that even in this field, consensus does not always exist (a prime example: climate change). It is totally unsuitable for analyzing non-consensual situations, and thus for the field of international relations and conflicts, where the minimum minimorum is the ability to identify the various -potentially antagonistic- transformations each actor seeks to impose: any approach that ignores this plurality of transformations would inevitably lead to flawed analyses.
Second level: strategic analysis
At a second level, strategic analysis requires considering the full range of situation analyses from all actors, each of whom has their own perspective and vision, and who seek a transformation that would allow them to move from one to the other. This helps highlight the divergences in prospectives among actors, as well as disparities in perception or perspective. While models such as the J-Curve assume that an insurrection is triggered when the deficits perceived by a population increase, it can be noted that this trigger also depends on the prospective divergences between the population and those in power.
In this case, there are significant divergences between the different segments of the Iranian population on the one hand (merchants, students, Kurds, etc.) and the government and its repressive apparatus (the Pasdaran, the police, and the Basij) on the other. However, a mobilization can be undermined by a lack of convergence between these segments: for example, Reza Pahlavi appears committed to the territorial integrity of Iran, whereas the Kurds would likely seek autonomy for Rojhilat. If a compromise is not reached, the mobilization risks failing. And even if it succeeds, a lack of convergence among the segments of the Iranian population could lead to their revolution being stolen from them, or to a civil war. With regard to external actors, given past betrayals, the Kurds may doubt the reliability of U.S. aid. Furthermore, Recep Erdogan could launch a military operation against the Iranian Kurds to prevent the emergence of an autonomous Rojhilat.
This second level also enables to assess the power of each actor, i.e. its relative capability to impose the transformation it desires. From an operational point of view, the perception of these powers plays a major role in decision-making processes, which makes a third level of analysis imperative.
Third level: the decisive role of perception of power
A third level involves considering the strategic analyses of the various actors, which enables, in particular, to highlight the differences—or distortions—between their assessments of power. While this approach may seem unnecessarily complex, it helps describe a crucial dynamic that any actor who has had to catalyze and lead a mobilization knows very well in practice: an actor will only join a mobilization if it believes that the movement’s power will exceed that of the regime.
The actor leading this mobilization must therefore proceed gradually: first mobilizing the most determined actors to build an initial power base that other actors will deem sufficient, prompting them to join the mobilization, thereby increasing its power and enabling the recruitment of even more actors. Hence the need to focus on the most motivated groups -for example, the Kurds- and the necessity of supporting them.
On the other hand, it is absolutely necessary to reduce the power of the repressive apparatus as much as possible, and for the population to perceive this weakening, not least because it is highly likely that the security apparatus will attempt to deter an uprising through particularly brutal repression. It is therefore crucial that the population be able to continue to stay informed and communicate; this is why considering a bombing of Iranian power plants -which would paralyze communications- is a major strategic mistake.
The informational dimension thus plays a central role, and a more comprehensive analysis would require taking into account the manipulation of information, and therefore continuing the analysis to a fourth level.