Taking into account operational realities and the complexity of situations, Relativized Cindynics are conceived as a common language designed to break free from cisversality, defined as static confinement within the boundaries of a discipline, sector or culture, and to promote transversality, i.e. the dynamic ability to cross these boundaries. The deal imposed by Donald Trump on Ukraine to capture its critical minerals shows the extent to which the scarcity of these resources is a source of conflictuality, and how the debate on the energy transition should not be dominated by technical analyses, and should take better account of the geopolitical dimension, particularly with regard to lithium-based solutions.

Gulf of Guinea, 2014: Ebola

In early 2014, an Ebola epidemic is spreading from Guinea to Liberia and Sierra Leone. On the ground in neighboring countries, concern is growing: in the evenings, under the mango trees, we wonder whether the bats emerging from them may carry the virus, and the announcement of the first European financial aid comes as a shock, given the so small amount allocated. It wasn't until MSF sounded the alarm that the organizations concerned realized the seriousness of the situation. The WHO launched an internal investigation to try and understand why it had not received the information: to date, the report does not appear to have been made public. Other analyses will incriminate structural adjustments and the dismantling of access to healthcare, which could have limited the epidemic. But another lesson, described by the Rand Corporation, went unnoticed at the time: communities that invest in strengthening cross-sectoral relationships are best placed to craft a strategic response to an emergency situation.

The epistemic strategy of Relativized Cindynics

And this lesson played an important role in the development of Relativized Cindynics by confirming its epistemic strategy: to design cindynic models as a common language so as to reduce what might be called cisversality, i.e. cis-disciplinary, cis-sectorial or ciscultural mindsets, by providing an instrument for strategic thinking and operational management that facilitates transdisciplinary, trans-sectorial and transcultural approaches. It is for this reason that Relativized Cindynics propose three deliberately simple and limited descriptive kernels: at first order, for vulnerable consensual situations, at second order for conflict situations, and at third order for the analysis of mobilization or coup d'état dynamics. And the underlying logic is very simple: in practice, no situation of danger or conflict affects a single sector, discipline or culture, and most situations are complex, in the sense that the issues of risk, conflict and development are inextricably intertwined. A striking example is the link between the energy transition and the dangerous increase in conflictuality on a global scale.

Geopolitics and critical minerals: US blackmail

As Russia invaded Ukraine, Vladimir Putin began to play the role of an apex predator. And today, Donald Trump is taking on the role of the one who's trying to take advantage of the situation to snatch a piece of his prey. In this case, the critical Ukrainian minerals. To achieve this, the Trump administration has relied on blackmail as immoral as it is effective, threatening to suspend military aid and intelligence. This betrayal by the United States leaves Europe alone to confront Russian neo-imperialism, and brings us a step closer to a third world conflict, which makes it all the more clear why critical minerals are potentially a major source of conflict.

Lithium and the energy transition: engineering realism versus geopolitical realism

In the field of global warming, it's surprising to see the extent to which debates on the energy transition are dominated by engineers, for whom physics alone would determine the most realistic solutions: the hydrogen sector is dismissed ad nutum, as the efficiency of hydrogen engines is too low compared to battery-powered electric vehicles. But from a geopolitical point of view, lithium is refined in China, and very few countries have lithium deposits: mainly Chile, Australia and perhaps the United States. In the light of more or less recent history, can France really still consider the United States or Australia as reliable? While an all-lithium/copper solution is the only realistic option for the engineer, it is unrealistic from a geopolitical point of view. The engineer fails to see that to base the functioning of all countries on resources available only in a handful of countries is geopolitical suicide. This is why, particularly when it comes to the energy transition, strategic decision-making must not be confined to the cisversality fortress.

Energy sovereignty: the hydrogen industry and the influence of Germany

What's more, the all-lithium/copper model is beginning to show its limits: Germany, for example, is unable to modernize its grid to transport its non-controllable energy southwards, while on the African continent, where almost all of the world's electricity access problems are concentrated, who can seriously hope that the electricity grid will be sufficiently developed for the use of electric vehicles to be possible before 2050? Japan, for its part, has understood the problem of critical minerals, and is directing its automotive industry towards the hydrogen solution: hydrogen combustion engines and nuclear hydrogen production. France, which is a major nuclear player, could be much more proactive in the field of red or pink hydrogen, but this strategy could upset Germany, which, as Alain Juillet described it, could have played a major role in the dismantling of French civil nuclear power. Germany has locked itself into coal and Europe into Russian gas. Is it really wise to let it lock the transition into lithium?