

Neosituationism

The Underlying Thinking of Relativized Cindynics

From Situation to Matrix :

A Manifesto for Emancipation and the Mastery of Changes

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Relativized Cindynics are based on universal values : their purpose is to protect life, humans, the environment, and human rights or liberties. They study the dynamics of human interactions and provide conceptual instruments and an operational method for mastering changes by crafting resilience and peace. The very nature of these issues and the need for operational efficiency have imposed specific epistemological choices. Although Relativized Cindynics are essentially axiologically non-neutral, their models are constructed with MRC, a one-of-a-kind general-purpose conceptualization method that Mioara Mugur-Schächter originally designed for the field of Quantum Mechanics : since these models can only be axiologically neutral, they are regrettably dual-purpose. All this suggests that the underlying thinking of Relativized Cindynics – epistemological choices, considered issues and their axiological tenets – needs to be made explicit. Neosituationism is this underlying thinking : it is here described in ordinary language, while the formal cindynic MRC descriptions are provided as an annex to give a succinct overview of their methodical construction process.

Origins, purpose and constitution

The *raison d'être* of Relativized Cindynics is to protect life, the environment, health, peace, human rights and civil liberties, information and knowledge, and the fundamental principles of democracy, including in cyberspace : Relativized Cindynics are fundamentally based on universal values. Indeed, we might consider them to be based on the set of values underpinning the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, provided we don't have a degenerate reading of it : Cindynics define degeneracy as a lack of – or wrong – priorities, thus, for instance, regarding these values, a degenerate reading would be to consider that intellectual property could prevail over the right to life.

The word Cindynics stems from the Greek κίνδυνος, meaning danger, risk, and also battle/engagement. Cindynics were born in the late 80 s, soon after Patrick Lagadec described the concept of *Risque Technologique Majeur*¹, when Georges-Yves Kervern² positioned human behavior and decision-making processes at the center of risk studies. Georges-Yves Kervern then learned about the work of Mioara Mugur-Schächter, who devised a unique³ scientific conceptualization method for Quantum Mechanics⁴, known today as MRC (Method of Relativized Conceptualization). This is how, towards the end of 1994, Georges-Yves Kervern began formally describing cindynic concepts using MRC, which was at the time known as Description Theory. This MRCization of cindynic concepts was then carried on to create second – and

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third-orderⁱ cindynic models (Figure 2), giving rise to what is now called Relativized Cindynics, this name having been coined by Mioara Mugur-Schächter in 2022. These specific origins of Relativized Cindynics are the reason why this approach to the dynamics of human interaction is impervious to ideological influences since its inception, be they non-falsifiable theories like psychoanalysis, or non-neutral Cold War-era Manichean thinking like Marxist doxa or Hayekian chaotic cosmology.

Georges-Yves Kervern first mentioned the idea of Neosituationism in 2002 in one of his working notes⁵, today preserved in the French *Archives nationales*, and then briefly described it in 2008⁶ as a project of philosophical interface between sustainable development research and cindynic research. That being said, the simple idea of drawing Neosituationism from Guy Debord's situationism may at first sight seem rather hazardous, at least in France, where Michel Onfray has harshly criticized Debord for overstating his role in the events of May '68, among other things. Anyway, this critique in no way undermines Debord's pivotal notion of *Société du spectacle*, which is what can be retained of his thoughts nowadays, as it happens to be particularly relevant in the age of cyberspace and hybrid or 'unrestricted' warfare, as we shall soon see. Basically, spectators, actors and scenarios are the core elements of cindynic situations : they are essential and pervasive through cindynic models from the first to the third order, and even beyond, whatever the issue at stake, be it risk, disasters, conflicts, information disorders, or perception manipulation and storytelling.

One reason why Neosituationism is needed lies in the versatile nature of this strange intellectual entity known as Relativized Cindynics : what are they ? Strategic thinking ? A risk management and conflict resolution method ? A non-normative, axiologically neutral science ? Axiologically neutral MRC models for various fields such as International Relationships or Social Sciences ? Axiologically non-neutral thinking ? Another quantum turn bandwagoning ? A short answer is : all at the same time, and more, except for the quantum turn. Social Sciences are notorious for the many 'turns' that have had an impact on their theoretical advances, one of the most recent being the infamous quantum turn. This turn is notably supported by Alexander Wendt, whose constructivist approach to International Relations theory is brilliant, but who is now evangelizing panpsychism or the speculative idea that consciousness is a fundamental quantum property of matter, on the grounds that since there would be no theory of consciousness, this postulate deserves serious consideration⁷. Russian researchers are also attempting to transpose quantum models into the Social Sciences – more specifically : 'applied' Social Sciences, or political engineering – for instance to describe strategic destabilization operations⁸ based on flooding money into opposition movements, in the same way that supplying more energy to a harmonic oscillator increases the number of its modes. On the other hand, it is true that Relativized Cindynics are, so to speak, epiphytes of MRC, which is a conceptualization method initially designed for Quantum Mechanics.

At this stage, it is necessary to grasp some of the basics of MRC, which is admittedly difficult, but if you are for instance familiar with object-oriented languages you will easily catch at least a part of the process. MRC is a phenomenological method that enables the gradual construction of concepts by chaining descriptions. In a few words : MRC posits the existence of a real word, material and immaterial or logical. The first MRC step is to select (or in some experiments : to generate) a part of reality, a phenomena or entity to be described : an entity is said to be selected by a generator. Then observers freely choose any aspects of a generated entity that should be measured : a set of aspects is a view. Thus an MRC description consists of a generator, an entity, and a view. Since observers are free to choose generators and views according to their descriptive aims, their descriptions are relative to these choices : this is the reason why MRC is called a relativized method, which thus fully considers the role of observers in the construction of descriptions, and is thereby a phenomenological method. This first description is a basic description. Then any part of this basic description (generator, entity, view, or even the whole description) can be selected as entity or part of an entity of a new description, called meta-description. From there, new meta-descriptions can subsequently be freely chained bottom-up and woven together for as long as necessary to construct concepts.

ⁱ Fourth-order models, dedicated to hybrid warfare, information warfare and the manipulation of opinions, are far more complex and will not be described in this document.

Therefore, MRC is a general fundamental method whose scope extends far beyond the horizon of Quantum Mechanics : it can be used in any field that needs to take into account the role of observers in phenomena modeling. Thus, Relativized Cindynics only use MRC to describe actual and relevant observed phenomena : they observe but do not speculate, and cannot be suspected of attempting to transplant exogenous quantum theoretical elements.

However, Relativized Cindynics concepts are constructed by chaining and weaving MRC descriptions : this process is both completely free in the sense that observers can freely choose generators, views and the chaining of meta-descriptions, and strictly rigorous in the sense that they have to specifically describe the generators and views they selected. The downfall is that these chained descriptions are axiologically neutral, which means that cindynic descriptions are dual-purpose : unfortunately, nothing can prevent an actor from using these models to craft changes that collide head-on with universal values and the axiologically non-neutral purpose of Cindynics. And this led to a major objective of Neosituationism : to theorize, explain and spread the cindynic values and thinking that cannot be embedded in cindynic formal models.

Henceforth, the sequential chaining and weaving of cindynic descriptions will be an Ariadne's thread providing a path through the many concepts, tenets and applications of Neosituationism.

1 First order : situation and vulnerability

1.1 Basic elements, rationality and inter-aspect relationships

To begin with, Cindynics consider five sets of basic elements (*0*) for any actor (*1*) : data or facts (statistic dimension), knowledge or models (epistemic), rules (nomic), values (axiologic), and goals (teleologic). These elements are interrelated (*1.2*) :

Goals – and therefore behaviors – are decided on the basis of other elements : facts, knowledge, rules and values. This is a description of decision making : the goals/data/knowledge subspace is directly inspired by Herbert Simon's bounded rationality. This approach, considering the lack of data, knowledge, or calculus power in a given time, is obviously not compatible with rational choice theory. Karl Popper acknowledged that the rationality principle was indeed false⁹, but considered it to be a good approximation. With what Cindynics – which deal with tragic real life events – have to disagree.

Let's consider the Rio Paris flight AF447 : the plane entered a stall shortly after 2:10 UTC, and crashed at 2:14 UTC. It was nighttime, the pilots were overwhelmed by computer alarms, and even though there were eventually three of them in the cockpit, they only had four minutes to realize that their plane was stalling, which they were unable to do. This is one of the reasons why, from a cindynic standpoint, rational choice cannot be considered as a good enough approximation : Karl Popper was considering the failure of the rationality principle model, while due to their very purpose and operational requirements, Cindynics have to provide a model of actual rationality failures, which is indeed the origin of cindynic spaces (or hyperspaces¹⁰) (*1.1*) and deficits (*3.1*).

The goals/rules/values subspace, compatible with the axiological rationality described by Max Weber or Raymond Boudon¹¹, was inspired in particular by the Bhopal chemical disaster – which left thousands of people dead and half a million injured – led early cindynicians to realize that some firms could reduce their safety efforts to the lowest level legally permitted in the countries where they operate, which they would not do if they had minimum ethical standards. By conceptualizing the cindynic space and adding an axiological dimension to it, Georges-Yves Kervern was a forerunner of business ethics in France.

The data/knowledge plane – defined as cindynometric plane – enables the description of other relationships, pertaining to the Data/Information/Knowledge question. Semantic information is here described as what can be extracted from data with knowledge. Hence a first relativity : actors with different knowledge will not extract the same information from a given set of data. Cindynics consider semantic information – which is exactly what Shannon explicitly considered in his seminal paper¹² to be outside the scope of his theory – and do not use any theoretical attempt to use Shannon’s theory to describe semantic information, or theories like veridicalism¹³. This attempted formal theory describes semantic information as linked to actual true facts, which would completely deplete any hypothesis, theory, ideal estimate or prospective of any information : from an operational cindynic standpoint this is not practicable, *a fortiori* when it comes to dealing with toxic information flows and opinion manipulation operations : lies do have meaning, and their meaning can kill people.

And actually did killed : for instance, for years Russian perception manipulation has targeted Sahelian populations, notably by claiming that the French Barkhane operation was aiding terrorist groups. In November 2021, civilians attacked a Barkhane convoy in Téra¹⁴, western Niger, because they actually believed it was supplying weapons to terrorist groups. These Russian lies led to a heavy casualty toll : three civilians were killed, seventeen civilians, seven Nigerien gendarmes and seven French soldiers were wounded. This illustrates the general, fundamental and tricky issue of actors' informational vulnerability, which is particularly baffling in this case. The Téra events highlight a hallmark of Russian perception manipulation, which exploits the informational vulnerability of certain populations, notably in Africa, by flooding them with crude lies without worrying that other actors on the international scene will not believe them.

Managing informational vulnerability is a risky undertaking : telling to targeted people that they are vulnerable to perception manipulation is not far from making them feel that their free will is being denied, which could trigger hostile reactions and, in the above-mentioned case, could be interpreted as paternalism or even racism, despite the fact that the aim of such an initiative is to foster emancipation and help people understand that perception manipulation is actually a form of enslavement. These conceivable reactions could represent a significant obstacle in the fight against perception manipulation.

There may also be relationships between knowledge and values, which makes it possible to describe axiological non-neutrality or, on the contrary, the absence of values that should underpin or protect the construction of knowledge, for example in the case of biological research, which may raise bioethics concerns.

Due to their very general nature, these five sets of basic elements can be used to address a wide range of issues. That being said, while some might consider them limiting, cindynic models are purposely designed to be extended as needed with MRC : this enables, for instance, to add another set of basic elements for taking psycho-affective factors into account when describing the decision-making processes that steer human behavior.

1.2 Individual and collective actors

Once basic elements are described, it is possible to describe real actors (*I*) viewed along the five sets of elements (or five dimensions) making up the cindynic space (*I.I*), and the inter-aspect relationships (*I.2*) between basic elements of different dimensions. Actors can be individual, or collective (any organization, institution, firm, state...). Collective actors can be composed of individual or collective actors, and any actor can be part of many collective actors. This enables, first, analysis of complex networks – including informal networks like cartels – where many set of actors are intermingled. And second, the choice of an optimal scale of analysis : for example, in the field of International Relations, it is more appropriate to consider collective actors such as States, institutions, transnational and international organizations or networks, and non-state actors in asymmetric situations. And third to describe the dynamics of actors construction or structuration (*Ib*), and micro-macro transitions or mobilization dynamics.

Contrary to Joseph Agassi's stance, Cindynics consider that collective actors do have goals. Moreover, cindynic descriptions establish that certain goals actually cannot be individual goals. And from a cindynic standpoint, contrary to what Michel Callon¹⁵ and Bruno Latour have suggested, an actor is not a non-human entity. Nevertheless, the rapid progress of artificial intelligence (AI) raises the question of when AIs will have to be considered cindynic actors, one criterion being when they acquire advanced autonomy, which may not be tomorrow but is nonetheless a chilling prospect that suggests the need for an international moratorium on AI advanced autonomy.

That being said, the issue of autonomy in the machine is nothing new : in march 2021, UN reported Turkish killer drones were used in Libya¹⁶. This UN report has received little or belated attention or media coverage¹⁷, which is somewhat disconcerting since it disclosed that these drones were used in autonomous mode, i.e. without any human intervention in the decision to identify and kill a target. In the human history this is a sea change : the first time that machines have been deployed to kill humans without any human intervention should attract more attention from the media, the public and institutions. From a cindynic perspective, this is precisely described as a deficit of information flow (3.3), which results in a deficit (3.1) of information and knowledge, which in turn is exactly what it takes to enable some actors to build one of the worst ever threats to humanity. Although some NGOs are campaigning against this dystopian development, and thousands of robotics and AI scientists have denounced it, some actors are encouraging it, like Eric Schmidt, who urged President Joe Biden to reject a ban on autonomous killing machines on the grounds that the USA should prepare to face China or Russia. Finally, the boundary between autonomous systems and systems capable of free intentionality appears blurred, making it delicate to define criteria for deciding which artifacts should be considered actors in cindynic models in the future.

1.3 Real situations and inter-actor immaterial flows

A real situation is described as a set of real actors (2) involved in a given issue, which includes notably to two new subviews : dissonances (2.1) and real flows (2.3). The word dissonance can be misleading : it refers obviously to Leon Festinger's notion of cognitive dissonances, but (for historical forgotten reasons) the cindynic equivalent of these dissonances is today named deficits (3.1). Anyway, dissonances are now defined as cindynogenic differences between different actors, more precisely between their basic elements : knowledge, rules, goals, etc. where 'cindynogenic' means producing danger. Obviously, not all differences between actors are cindynogenic, nevertheless this raised the question of human diversity, which is one of the reflections that led to second-order Cindynics.

Immaterial flows are defined as flows of basic elements from one actor to another or to others : they may be information, knowledge, rules, values or goals. At first glance, the notion of law flows may seem intriguing, but the history of the legal protection of digital rights management systems (DRMS) will highlight the usefulness of this notion : in a nutshell, in 1994 a working group on intellectual property rights wrote a green paper for the Clinton administration, which led to the drafting of the NIICPA bill. This immediately caused an uproar, and thousands of law professors sharply denounced the bill. While this project was apparently abandoned, a maneuver known as legislative bootstrapping resulted in a WIPO treaty that allowed the United States to impose the infamous DMCA to replace the defunct NIICPA. But with the European Union having signed the WIPO treaty, this led to the EUCD directive, which in turn had to be transposed notably into French law, resulting in one of the two fiercest battles in history between French cyber-activists and the French government.

The bottom line being that since the new law would prohibit to play a *legally* acquired DVD on Linux – where DRMS are illusory – less users would use Linux and more of them Windows, which would be detrimental to the free software community in particular and to users' rights in general. And this is the untold reason why Microsoft lobbyists were so eager to promote the EUCD directive in France. This example clearly depicts law flows between the United States and the member states of the European Union, hence the usefulness of this cindynic notion.

A law flow can also consist in a flow of deregulation : such is the case with the spread of economic Neoliberalism, which began with Margaret Thatcher and the deregulation of the city in the mid-80s, on the Hayekian¹⁸ premise that the economy should be better managed by market forces. This economic chaotic ideology has spread worldwide, including to post-Soviet Russia, where it has led to the emergence of oligarchs. Interestingly, this phenomenon thus combines a law flow (deregulation) and a knowledge-value flow consisting of the spread of an economic model which is non-neutral and based on specific values. Which Margaret Thatcher summarized succinctly in 1981 : “Economics are the method ; the object is to change the heart and soul”¹⁹.

This process can be schematically outlined (Figure 1) by inter-actor relationships and inter-actor flows : a modeller constructs an economic model on the grounds of specific values (1), this model is then notably chosen by a legislator (for instance on the grounds of shared values) who constructs laws implementing the model (2b), then agents have to comply to the new rules, i.e. their objectives – thereby behaviors – are constrained by these rules (3), the modeller can then observe agents behavior and adjust or even *a posteriori* justify the model according to these observations (4). This loop can thus describes Pygmalion effects or self-fulfilling prophecies. This is obviously a simplified outline, which should also depict value flows and be extended to many modellers and legislators in order to describe a global spreading, but it gives a first insight into how to use cindynic descriptive bricks to better structure the analysis of situation dynamics.




Figure 1: Models and law spreading : inter-actor relationships and inter-actor flows

1.4 Ideal actors and situations

The next step is to describe ideal actors and ideal situations : quite simply, an ideal situation (2') is an estimate of how the situation should be to be resilient, i.e. how and who its actors should be, hence the notion of ideal actor (1'). Ideal actors descriptions enable ideal relationships to be defined (1.2'), i.e. what should be the relationships between aspects of different nature : for instance between a rule and a decision, or between a value and the construction of a given knowledge, or between data and the model used to analyze it, or between law and ethics. Ideal situations descriptions enable tolerances to be defined (2.1') as non cindynogenic differences between actors that should exist, which is a view that will later be used to formalize the notion of human diversity, and ideal flows (2.3') as immaterial flows that should ideally ex-

ist : this notably describes fundamental societal and cybersocietal questions such as what knowledge people should have access to, what information should they be able to get, what information or data about citizens a State could be authorized to get, or who is authorized to spread what information ?

1.5 Situations, objectivity, propensity and vulnerability

The description of real situations and ideal situations enable the formalization of the pivotal notion of cindynic situation (3), which is described as composed of a real situation and an ideal situation. The notion of situation is drawn in particular from one aspect of situations described by Karl Popper : real situations, historic ones, are never the same, and always changing²⁰. But the cindynic notions of situations are different from the three kind of situations that Karl Popper described²¹. In particular, Cindynics do not consider ‘objective situations’: an observed situation is always nothing else than perceived. An observer is never able to know what a situation ‘*in itself*’ is, he always has his own point of view, or description : an actor always has his own way of spectating. This is notably a direct consequence of the phenomenological nature of MRC, and a reason why Mioara Mugur-Schächter is substituting the classical conception of objectivity with the notion of objectivity as intersubjective consensus²².

Taking into account the changing nature of real world situations led Georges-Yves Kervern to reject probabilistic approaches, which he considered to be a conceptual field too insufficiently decanted²³ to be used in danger studies. The inadequacy of frequency approaches is illustrated by the failure to forecast the coup d’État attempted by Lieutenant Obiang²⁴ in early 2019 in Gabon : this country was estimated as one of the three African countries with the lowest estimated risk of coup in an OEF Research report²⁵. Political forecasting research has a complicated history, to say the least : after failing to predict the collapse of the Soviet bloc, political forecasting became the subject of suspicion, and the opinions of experts were even compared to those of “dart-throwing chimpanzees”²⁶. Then the Political Instability Task Force project, funded by the CIA²⁷, rekindled interest in the field, and paved the way for a new generation of forecasting using new methods, such as machine learning, which could improve forecasting capabilities and confidence in forecasts. Nevertheless, Clayton Besaw and Jonathan Powell recognized that machine learning had trouble foreseeing coups²⁸, which led them to estimate that only Seychelles and Tanzania had a higher risk of coup than Gabon in their 2019 Annual risk of coup report. After analyzing this forecasting failure, the authors concluded that Lieutenant Obiang's coup highlighted the need for qualitative expertise²⁹ to reduce the gaps between macro-quantitative forecasting and the micro-dynamics determining coup risks.

Three years later, with successful military coups in half a dozen Sahelian countries since Obiang's attempted coup (to which, unsurprisingly, must now be added the coup of August 2023 in Gabon), and the emergence of an outstanding ‘coup belt’ where antidemocratic thinking will thrive and irradiate – which constitutes a strategic threat – the need to overcome frequency-based only approaches to coups and the relevance of the *ad hoc* cindynic propensionist approach should become clearer³⁰. This approach is based on cindynic power (i.e. *puissance/potentia*) analysis, thus on second – and third-order cindynic models, which will be presented later below.

Interestingly, the cindynic rejection of frequency approaches is an epistemic move diametrically opposed to that of Claude Lévi-Strauss in the late 50s : in his time, with the success of Cybernetics, some scientists in the field of human sciences hoped to use statistical and mathematical tools too. Yet, Claude Lévi-Strauss noted that Norbert Wiener had warned that social phenomena lasted too long in relation to the possible duration of a study, making it impossible to obtain significant statistical results³¹, and that observation could affect the observed phenomena : Claude Lévi-Strauss thus found that linguistic and language structure were not subject to Norbert Wiener's objections and allowed the use of statistics. In addition, structuralism tends to focus on invariant structures, whereas Cindynics rely on a constructivist approach and purposely focus precisely on the transformation of situations, whether unintentional or intentional, and whether intentions are manipulated or not.

The inadequacy of frequency approaches led early cindynicians to adopt a propensionist approach, where, at first glance, propensity refers to Karl Popper's view that propensities are real forces³². Nevertheless, as Mioara Mugur-Schächter has noted, Karl Popper never provided a proper definition of propensity. At a deeper level, although it could seem a little bit cryptic, cindynic propensities are actually directly inspired by Sun Tzu and the pivotal concept of the Art of War : *shi* 勢. A concept that is barely visible to Westerners who are introduced to the Art of War through translations concealing the character 勢, and therefore the corresponding concept, so brilliantly deciphered³³ by François Jullien a while ago. Briefly, for Sun Tzu, 勢 is not just propensity, it is the mastery of propensity, thus of fates, which exactly serves the aim of Cindynics³⁴ : preventing detrimental events, disasters and conflicts. And this by the attrition of vulnerability and conflictuality, preferably *ex ante*. And actually, understanding cindynic operations could help Westerners to better grasp Sun Tzu's 勢 concept.

Situation descriptions enable the definition of operationally important sub-views. : deficits, and situation vulnerability. The vulnerability (3.6) of a situation is defined as its propensity to trigger detrimental events, and is an increasing function of deficits and dissonances. The core of cindynic operations consists in reducing deficits and dissonances by transforming actors, thereby their situation, to reduce its vulnerability : this is the concept of mastery of propensities, directly drawing from Sun Tzu 勢 concept. The resilience of a situation is defined as the inverse of its vulnerability, which is a formal cindynic definition contrasting with the many definitions of resilience that many actors may have, or not, the important point to grasp being that by definition a situation that triggers damaging events is initially not resilient. This should help to avoid misinterpretations that might see the cindynic concept of resilience as favoring social Darwinism.³⁵.

1.6 Deficits and vulnerability

Deficit diagnosis and reduction are a major part of the core of cindynic operations, they can be systemic, relational, dynamic and topological.

Systemic deficits

Systemic deficits (3.1) are defined as a cindynogenic presence or absence of an element in the cindynic space of a real actor, or the differences between the space of a real actor and the one of the corresponding ideal actor : these elements can be information, knowledge, rules, values or objective. A cindynogenic absence is called lacuna, and a cindynogenic presence is called an eminence. Another deficit is degeneracy, defined as the absence of order or priority on one dimension of an actor's space.

The case of the Boeing 737 max illustrates many deficits : briefly, the 737 was designed a long time ago with short landing gear to facilitate boarding. Faced with the Airbus neo, Boeing had to switch to low-consumption engines, with a high bypass ratio and therefore a larger fan diameter, which did not fit under the wings due to the historical choice of short landing gear. This led Boeing engineers to move the engines forward and upward, increasing the plane's propensity to nose up, thereby making it prone to stall, which was worked around by MCAS, a computer program that automatically trims the plane to nose dive when close to a stall. This led to two crashes, Lion Air 610 and Ethiopian Airlines 302, which killed 346 people. The pilots were not aware of the existence of MCAS, which is the main cause of the crashes : this is an information and knowledge lacuna. Moreover, Boeing deliberately decided not to reveal the existence of MCAS to the pilots, since this would have required costly pilot training, and would have made the 737 max less attractive : Boeing gave priority to economic objectives over safety ones. This unfortunately classic behavior is an epitome of degeneracy of objectives, or teleological degeneracy. And this in turn is basically the result of an axiologic lacuna.

Knowledge lacunas are also observed in geopolitical situations : in the Sahel, France had to send in its army to fight terrorism, due to the regrettable – and often shamefully forgotten – fact that neither the UN, nor the AU, nor ECOWAS, nor

Mali, nor Burkina, nor Niger were either able or willing to fight terrorists groups. Mali has a long-standing internal conflict with the Tuareg in Azawad, and when the MNLA liberated Kidal from the Islamist, some actors in Bamako wanted the FAMA to return to Kidal. Since the first Tuareg rebellion in 1963, the Bamako authorities have never been able to achieve a political resolution of the Tuareg question, and exploiting the French anti-terrorist operations to fight the Tuareg could have been seen as an alternative to a political resolution. This is how Russia began to support Malian activists calling for the return of FAMA to Kidal, and launched deception operations targeting the population, vilifying French policy as Neo-colonialist, French military as looting gold and supplying weapons to terrorists, and promised that Wagner mercenaries would help retake Kidal from the Tuareg. Although Barkhane was an ongoing military success, Russian deception operations ultimately led to coups forcing the withdrawal of French forces from Mali, and to a swift military control³⁶ of Malian journalists.

Finally, while French military operations – albeit of long duration due to the extent of the territories to be protected and the unfortunate persistent inability of local forces to defend themselves – were not defeated, French institutions completely neglected Russian information warfare. This situation is due to a major knowledge deficit : French institutions have not been able to understand the strategic importance of information (cyber-)warfare early enough, nor to gather and operate adequate know-how. Things recently began to change, notably when faced with Wagner's staging of a fake mass grave in Gossi, Mali, which was intended to frame France, French officers like Pascal Ianni realized it was necessary to publish aerial video evidences of this crude staging in order to debunk it as it was spreading on social medias. Nevertheless, as late as early 2023, concerned actors were deploring this knowledge deficit and the inertia slowing down its resolution.

An example of information eminence (cindynogenic presence) is the mention of ethnicity on Rwandan identity cards before the genocide, which was used by Hutu extremists at checkpoints to determine who to kill. And this information eminence is itself the result of a rule imposing it, which constitutes a rule eminence, i.e. a nomic deficit. Interestingly, the French Quilès parliamentary report on Rwanda mentions that before the genocide, French officials had asked the Rwandan authorities to remove the mention of ethnicity on identity cards, considering it a shocking practice : the problem is that the Duclert report on French responsibility in Rwanda makes no mention of this fact, which constitutes an information lacuna, since this fact would not be consistent with the conclusion of the Duclert report, which blames French institutions for having adopted an 'ethnicist' reading grid³⁷. Cindynics can analyze historiography, and indeed must do so when the way history is written may have geopolitical consequences : this is typically the case with the Duclert report, whose conclusion could be used by Russian manipulation of perception in Africa, and which was written in a context where a diplomatic rapprochement between France and Rwanda was being sought. That being said, regarding the reputation risk of France in Africa, it is far from certain that a rapprochement with Paul Kagame's regime would be widely appreciated in other African countries, given the way people may actually see Kagame in Africa. Another major lacuna in the Duclert report is that it makes no mention of the declassified US directive PDD-25³⁸, which was drafted before the battle of Mogadishu, and which led US diplomacy and Madeleine Albright to persistently thwart UN peacekeeping operations in Rwanda, long before and during the genocide, which could otherwise have been averted.

Technological progress continuously generates deficits (information, knowledge and rules lacunas), since actors need time to familiarize themselves with new technologies. This was typically the case in France in the early 2000s, when Internet access was spreading and legislators had to transpose European directives that notably affected freedom of speech in the cyberspace. For instance, under lobbying pressure, the transposition of Directive 2000/31/EC into French law was exploited in order to make hosting providers liable for content published by Internet users, which would have bypassed judicial authority by compelling providers to judge content and censor it. This was seen as a denial of independent justice, which gave rise to an 18 month battle between cyber-activists and providers on the one hand, and the cultural industries lobby, government officials and a majority of members of parliament on the other, during which cyber-activists sent tens of millions of e-mails to the parliament. It was then noticed that most of the actors in the ministries and in parlia-

ment did not know the basics of the Internet and did not understand the actual meaning of the bill, and, symptomatically, more than 95 % of members of parliament did not attend the debate on this bill. This situation was publicly denounced in the French Senate by Jack Ralite, a senator and former minister, who bluntly claimed : “We do not understand a thing”.

Relational deficits

The previous example brings us to the notion of relational deficits (3.2) defined as cindynogenic relationships between elements of different nature, for instance between knowledge and rules, or as the difference between a relationship in a real actor space and the corresponding ideal actor space. Relational deficits can in particular be disjunctions (cindynogenic absence of a relationship) or subjunctions (cindynogenic presence of a relationship). The previous example typically illustrates a disjunction between knowledge and lawmaking due to knowledge deficits.

Subjunctions can be observed, for instance, in the field of economics : Friedrich Hayek explicitly acknowledged that his doctrine stemmed from his deep dissatisfaction with the world as it was, thereby admitting *de facto* that it was axiologically non-neutral. It becomes a value/knowledge subjunction when this non-neutrality is concealed in order to present his economic doctrine as an objective science³⁹ unconcerned with ethics, which is full-fledged positivism. Nor are Cindynics axiologically non-neutral, since universal values are the foundation of their *raison d'être*. Nevertheless, their non-neutrality is not obfuscated, for their part, cindynic models are neutral, and Relativized Cindynics are not exactly prescriptive since they simply provide tools to actors so they can co-prescribe the changes they wish, and once again, although this is a regrettable curse, there is nothing to deter actors from using cindynic models to intentionally prescribe or operate harmful transformations.

Dynamic deficits

Dynamic deficits (3.3) affect the dynamics of situations, more precisely the immaterial flows between actors, like information or knowledge flows, law or value flows. They represent cindynogenic flows (or absence of flow) and are formally described as the differences between real flows between real actors, and ideal flows between ideal actors in an ideal situation. Historically, Relativized Cindynics were formalized following the development of Information Cindynic (Infocindynic), dedicated to the cindynic approach to information risk in general, and Internet risk – whether informational, epistemic, legal or legislative – in particular, which highlighted the need to formalize non-consensual situations. And this has led to the description of immaterial flows and to identify in particular three categories of dynamic deficits : disclosing flows (harming the source actor *e.g.* confidentiality, secret or privacy), suppressed flows (*e.g.* censorship), and toxic flows (harming the targeted actor *e.g.* deception and perception manipulation). This enables notably the description of most threats in cyberspace, from a standpoint that considers cyber-societal issues in particular, and is not limited to mere technical aspects. Dynamics deficits have a dual meaning or perception : they can be considered or perceived as vulnerability factors, or as immediate actual damage. Or, as damage that can trigger subsequent damage.

Disclosing flows

Disclosing flows (3.3.1) describe notably flows of information or knowledge extracted intentionally from an actor or disseminated involuntarily by an actor. A major disclosing information flow is mass surveillance, which has become a global issue : as Michel Foucault described it as panopticism, he noticed a major reversal between antique civilizations, which were spectacle civilizations where the masses spectated a few actors, and modern societies, where a few actors observe the masses. If Michel Foucault viewed the generalization of panopticism as aiming to build disciplinary societies⁴⁰, contemporary panopticism cannot be reduced to this unique aim : technology advances enabled Big Tech companies to harvest exponentially increasing amounts of user data, giving rise to data capitalism and privacy concerns, and since 9/11 states are increasingly using surveillance technology to fight terrorism. Nevertheless, from September 2001 onwards,

anti-terrorist laws were passed notably in France, where although it was argued during the debates that these laws were exceptional, limited to anti-terrorist purposes and temporary, their scope was eventually extended far beyond anti-terrorism a few years later, and they were made permanent.

Data retention is a post 9/11 dynamic deficit : in the European Union, Internet Service Providers (ISPs) were required to record users' activities, which is equivalent to state-wide eavesdropping, since institutions can access this data for a variety of reasons, actually. In France such recording has been imposed by the LSQ law of November 2001, and in the EU, by the Data Retention Directive 2006/24/EC. In France, while this data was originally accessible to anti-terrorist services, the scope was extended, notably in 2009 to protect intellectual property, and tax authorities also stealthily gained administrative access to this data. In April 2014, the Court of Justice of the European Union declared this directive invalid as it was infringing the fundamental right to privacy, and in October 2020, the same Court ruled that data retention is not allowed in the European Union for reasons other than national security, but compliance with these rulings is still an ongoing process in some member states.

Disclosing information flows can be life-threatening when personal information is disclosed : such is the case with Facebook's real-name policy, which requires users to provide and use their real names, and bans pseudonyms. This policy was advocated by Mark Zuckerberg's sister⁴¹, who argued that under their real names, users would not publish anything inappropriate. Minor changes were realized after it was denounced, notably as a threat to people discriminated and persecuted on the grounds of gender or ethnicity. But when American troops withdrew from Afghanistan, the Taliban were able to use Facebook's public identities to track down Afghans⁴² and Facebook had to take specific measures to lock Afghan accounts. Which, in any case, leaves this issue unresolved.

Another example is the pseudonymity of authors and journalists, which is a longstanding tradition that protects them, and in some cases even their lives. And yet, in France, pseudonymity is not recognized for self-published authors, who must obtain ISBNs from AFNIL (who also supplies ISBNs for most Francophone African countries) since the AFNIL website publishes authors' real names and refuses to publish pseudonyms instead of real identities. In some cases, this policy actually puts lives at risk. Here is a concrete example of AFNIL's policy implementation : an author intending to publish a book covering the activities of Prigozhin in Africa – and notably in the Central African Republic (where three journalists have already been killed) – asked AFNIL to display his pseudonym instead of his identity on their public website, which was denied despite the explanation they were provided with. As a result, the author will no longer have the possibility of traveling to Bangui to carry out his investigations without risking his life, since AFNIL spilled his identity⁴³ on the Internet. That demonstrates how information spills – in this case, an intentional one – can be life-threatening.

Invasive limit

Disclosing information flows impose a fundamental limit on cindynic observation : since violating confidentiality or privacy harms actors, which is notably what Cindynics are designed to prevent, cindynic observation must not go beyond what does not harm actors, which is defined as the invasive limit.

Suppressed flows

Suppressed flows (3.3.2), can describe any kind of censorship or restriction to access to information or knowledge, which at first glance seems a simple issue, but indeed is a delicate one, especially due to major geopolitical consequences. Censorship in cyberspace is an endemic problem that emerged early on due to either an absence of regulation, a difficulty to understand how to apply existing regulation, or a difficulty to adapt regulation, which led to recurrent conflicts between cyber-activists and legislators. Nevertheless, it's worth noting that even when Directive 2000/31/EC was being transposed in France, cyber-activists never adopted an absolutist stance, and only demanded that only an indepen-

dent judge should be able to judge published content before, if need be, a technical take-down, and that neither providers nor any private entity be required to judge content published on the Internet. This stance is grounded in the fundamental right to a fair hearing by an impartial tribunal, guaranteed by article 10 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.

In this respect, to see some US Democrats asking social media providers to remove contentious messages posted by Donald Trump might be somewhat disturbing, whatever he may precisely have posted, which is not the point. Moderation has always been a daily practice on social media, and it might at first glance be considered highly excessive to demand that any censorship be decided solely by the judiciary, given the vast amount of data involved. But this is a narrow analysis that totally overlooks a major geopolitical issue : social media are now used *de facto* on a global scale, which means that worldwide censorship is now decided mainly by private US companies. And this immediately brings to mind the third form of state power that E.H. Carr described on the eve of the Second World War : “power *over* opinions”.

This strategic issue is illustrated by Big Tech censorship of government officials in Africa : a tweet posted by Nigerian President Buhari on June 1, 2021 was deleted by Twitter⁴⁴ due to its hostility towards the Igbo people, as it was considered a violation of Twitter rules. The Nigerian government retaliated by suspending Twitter in Nigeria. NGOs then condemned the ban, and Amnesty International argued that it violated freedom of expression and access to information, but failed to mention the issue of US private censorship in Nigeria, which in itself may also be considered as violating freedom of expression by superseding Nigerian justice. Then in November 2021, Facebook removed a post⁴⁵ from Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed calling citizens to take arms against TPLF rebels. This take-down occurred as Frances Haugen, a Facebook whistle-blower, blamed Facebook for “literally fanning ethnic violence”⁴⁶ by its lack of moderation in countries at war like Ethiopia.

These cases clearly raise the question of threats to digital sovereignty, notably in Africa, where Togolese former Minister Kako Nubukpo considered⁴⁷ Big Tech censorship a digital sovereignty issue. Moreover, this Big Tech censorship power over African countries could be seen as cyber-colonialism, which would increase US reputation risk and undermine its soft power. Incidentally, the fact that Big Tech operates in many countries does not exempt them from following the laws of these countries, whose legislators may resolve identified rules lacunas by adopting laws regulating Big Tech or exogenous cyber-activities on their territory. And subsequently, this brings other issues, as some countries might foster deception for strategic purposes or government officials might use social media during civil wars. For instance : would the Malian military junta request the removal of messages that present the fake mass grave staged in Gossi as a real one and attribute it to the French military ? Or would Ethiopian judges request to take down Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed’s posts against Tigray people ? Ultimately, this analysis points in one direction : the balkanization of the Internet.

Toxic flows

Toxic flows (3.3.3) describe undesired cindynogenic immaterial flows that have harmful or deceptive effects on targets or receiving actors. Based on toxic information flows, deception is undoubtedly as old as war and politics, but the emergence of the cyberspace has considerably extended this threat, a noteworthy example being Russian deception operations which are a major component of hybrid warfare, particularly in Africa. For years, the media have focused on Wagner's mercenaries activities in the Middle East and Africa, or on the meddling of Prigozhin's Internet Research Agency (IRA) in the US elections. But Russian trolls activities in Africa long went unnoticed, and it was only belatedly that the extent of Prigozhin’s nebula activities was publicized. These deception operations involve a wide range of means : buying local media in Africa, paying journalists to write – or just sign – articles, organizing rallies and paying protesters, trolling on social media, operating local troll farms in Ghana or Nigeria (which are less easy to detect than IRA trolls in St. Petersburg, but at the cost of lowering the level of the posted content), diplomatic support to opposition movements, crackdown on journalists in countries where pro-Russian military took power, like in Mali, and hijacking panafricanism.

Hybrid warfare and strategic perception manipulation, particularly in cyberspace, give Debord's notion of spectacle an unprecedented new dimension : as the Internet has now spread worldwide, what people see of the world is primarily no longer what they observe directly, but increasingly what certain actors paint, which may be part of the reality or may be lies. And this, hard as it may be for vulnerable actors to admit, threatens free will. In other words : perception manipulation can be considered the 21st century's form of enslavement. Although fact-checking is generally considered a suitable response, the simple notion of fact-checking is in itself misleading : by debunking lies as they happen, fact-checkers most of the time completely forget – or avoid – to investigate the strategic actors flooding disinformation and their agenda. Symptomatically : French reporters Jousset and Bolchakova managed to interview a whistle-blower, now a refugee in France, and revealed that Russian operators had set up a troll farm right in the Presidency in Bangui. Even though their report⁴⁸ won the Albert Londres prize, to date hardly any media – nor diplomats – mentioned this Russian-Central African troll farm and its operations, and notably not in Africa. And this amounts to a dynamic deficit.

Regarding toxic law flows : TRIPS agreements illustrate undesired legislative flows spreading patents globally. In the wake of the GATT negotiations and as the WTO was created, industry lobbying pressure led to the 1994 TRIPS agreements, which imposed rules designed to protect intellectual property rights, in particular to developing countries, including the obligation to comply to pharmaceutical patents, which threatens health in these countries. And notably in Africa, where the resulting increase in the price of medicines simply prevents the majority of the population from obtaining them, thereby actually putting lives at risk. While pharmaceutical patents had previously been abolished in India, which, in *Médecins Sans Frontières* words, allowed this country to become the “pharmacy of the developing world”⁴⁹, India had to comply with pharmaceutical patents in particular after the 2003 agreements on exports, which were denounced by the WHO⁵⁰ and NGOs in 2005 as denying developing countries access to new treatments, which would henceforth be protected by patents for twenty years. While the Doha declaration aimed at limiting TRIPS patent abuses that harm developing countries, United-States has undertaken to impose bilateral agreements known as TRIPS+ on many countries, in order to circumvent it and impose even worse restrictions than TRIPS⁵¹, including longer patent terms, and restrictions on compulsory licenses⁵² that allowed production without the consent of patent owners. This is why TRIPS+ bilateral agreements were officially denounced in 2004 by French President Jacques Chirac as “immoral blackmailing”⁵³. Etiologically, TRIPS agreements stem from an axiologic degeneracy, and are the epitome of a degenerative reading of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, since these agreements reflect a stance which considers that intellectual property rights can take precedence over the right to life.

Vulnerability and preventive transformation

Vulnerability (3.5) is defined as the propensity of a situation to generate damages, and is a function increasing with deficits and dissonances. Crafting resilience (defined as the inverse of vulnerability) thus relies on reducing deficits and dissonances *ex-ante*. These operations are described as Intentional Transformation Operators (ITO), consisting in changing a real situation to match an estimated ideal situation. A vulnerable situation thus has two ways to be transformed : either it remains vulnerable, and it will change when a disaster occurs, this transformation phenomena being described as a Disaster Transformation Operator (DTO), or it is transformed by an ITO that makes it invulnerable. Mastering vulnerability, i.e. situation propensity, by applying ITOs is the pivotal concept of cindynic preventive operations, as mastering propensities is the core concept of Sun Tzu's Art of war.

Friction

In real life, not all of an ITO's objectives can be achieved, for a variety of reasons : this suggested to define friction as the difference between an estimated ideal situation and the actual situation transformed by an ITO, which is inspired by Clausewitz's notion of friction, seen as the difference between the war theorized on paper and what actually happens on the battlefield. Attempting to reduce friction in order to increase operational efficiency has therefore led to an attempt to

identify its factors, and what hinders the reduction of deficits and dissonances. It turns out that a common factor is the absence of consensus between actors : this reflection has contributed to paving the way for second-order cindynic models by taking into account the difference between actors' diagnoses or expectations.

2 Second order : spectrum, conflictuality and diversity

When, on the previous pages, I consider deficits, for example TRIPS+ as undesired axiologically degenerated law flow, or data retention as illegitimate mass surveillance, this is the result of my subjective estimation of ideal situations. And when I describe or summarize real situations, I do so in a certain way : this is also a subjective or idiosyncratic point of view. It is perfectly conceivable, and I have seen it first-hand for some of the examples I have described above, that other actors may have different estimates or points of view. This obviously suggests that efforts must be made to be, if not objective, at least more stringent, which is directly linked to Mioara Mugur-Schächter's notion of objectivity as inter-subjective consensus.

Thus, it is clear that situations are relative : the relativization of cindynic situations takes observers into account, which is the founding principle of second-order Cindynics, and incidentally, of second-order Cybernetics. The second founding principle of second-order descriptions is a generalization of the notion of Intentional Transformation Operator : first-order Cindynics consider only two types of transformation – disasters, and intentional preventive operations – but since a transformation can be subjectively perceived as damaging by some actors and beneficial by others, second-order descriptions must consider any kind of transformation, called Generalized Transformation Operators (GTO), that can be preventive, intentional and hostile, or development operations. This enables actors to cope with complex situations where issues of risk, conflict and development (RCD) are interwoven, which is typically the kind of situations that are pervasive in Africa. And indeed, living in Africa was an incentive to extend cindynic models to address RCD complexity. In addition, the need to make cindynic models adaptable became more apparent, and discussions with Pr Assima-Kpatcha at the University of Lomé led to the notion of Cindynics Africanization. And therein lies the second major role of MRC for Cindynics : it enables (advanced) users to freely extend cindynic descriptions to better fit their specific situations, and thereby increase operational efficiency.

In an ideal world, actors involved in the prevention of simple conventional risk, such as illness, accidental death or environmental damage, should be expected to be easily able to share a consensual position. Unfortunately, this is rarely the case in real life. Indeed, in all the examples mentioned above, it is difficult to find even one consensual situation. Today, the most striking example is undoubtedly that of global warming, as humanity had to struggle through numerous international summits to seek a common position and try to implement efficient policies to tackle climate change. Second-order models describe these negotiation processes, the divergences and differences in perception between actors, which enables the description of the notion of conflictuality, which must be seen as a *continuum*.. Furthermore, climate change could have dramatic effects such as large refugee flows triggering conflicts, whether civil or military. Second-order descriptions provide tools to reduce conflictuality and prevent conflict, and also help to better understand the notion of diversity, which might be useful in such situations.

At the opposite end of the conflictuality continuum are conflict situations (i.e. heretofore : military conflicts) but the boundaries between war and peace are now blurring, notably with the emergence of new doctrines such as Qiao & Wang's "unrestricted warfare", which is a slightly misleading title chosen by CIA translators before the English translation⁵⁴ of this doctrine was published in Panama. The original title, 超限战⁵⁵, more precisely means war beyond limits (implicitly : of military domain). In a nutshell : noticing convergence issues and the extension of the security domain to non-military domains, and explicitly drawing inspiration from Machiavelli, Qiao and Wang have conceptualized nothing less than – in their own words – a "great Art of War" (大战法) designed to combine military and non-military operations (including information operations, notably in cyberspace), thereby transgressing the limits not of war, but of the military

domain of war. This extension of the domain of war beyond military operations, encroaching on the field of civil risk, is of opposite direction and rejoins the extension of the domain of Cindynics, which were initially focused on risk, since the scope of Relativized Cindynics now extend to the domain of conflict, and more generally to the dynamics of human interactions.

2.1 Spectrum

The relativization of situations enables the description of spectrums (4), defined as sets of relative situations, i.e. of situations observed by the actors of these situations. In *spectacle* terms : a situation is a set of actors that I am observing or 'spectating' : I observe real actors performing, and I estimate an ideal situation, in other words, I would like to change the ongoing scenario. In a spectrum, all actors are at the same time spectators, and scenarists seeking to change the ongoing scenario. By shifting to second-order, I am simply acknowledging that other actors have the same observational and analysis skills as I do. But, more importantly, I describe the various transformations that different observers seek to implement.

A spectrum is thus a strategic synthetic view that describes a transformation field, a set of different transformations that different observers are actually trying to impose, or seek to impose and will eventually do so as soon as they have the means to do so. And in this case, a spectrum describes a propensity field, where each actor has a propensity to implement a transformation operator that may be antagonistic to other transformations.

2.2 Divergences

A real situation perceived by an observer is called his perspective (2), and the corresponding ideal situation that this observer estimates or seeks is called his prospective (2'). Divergences are defined as the differences between observers' prospectives (4.1) i.e. the differences between the ideal situations estimated and sought by the different observers : as for deficits, divergences can be systemic (4.1.1), relational (4.1.2), dynamic (4.1.3), or topological (4.1.4).

Dynamic divergences can describe most of information flow polemics in the cyberspace : privacy, censorship, or deception. For instance users do not accept that tax authorities may access their Internet browsing history, but tax authorities sought (and managed) to get access to these private data. Or users want access to information that is kept secret, even though it is in the public interest for citizens to have access to it : for instance, the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) that USA sought to impose notably to the European Union was kept secret for national security reasons, and the Obama administration even denied FOIA requests⁵⁶. While European citizens could not access the non-disclosed information, the Obama administration granted this access to some lobbyists⁵⁷ operating on behalf of Time Warner, Sony Pictures, the BSA, Google or the MPAA, among others. Ultimately, the European parliament rejected this agreement. Furthermore, ACTA itself, as a law flow, generated dynamic divergences between US government and the IP lobby on the one hand, and citizens and members of the parliament in the European Union, who, on the other hand, were opposed to this law flow.

Systemic divergences are a powerful forecasting and preventive tool : prior to the genocide in Rwanda, the Arusha Accords gave Kagame's RPF disproportionate rights of representation in the Rwandan government, all the more so as the RPF was even a decried minority among the 59ers⁵⁸ Tutsi refugees in Uganda. Incidentally, France was supporting the Arusha Accords, and the over-representation offered to the RPF by these accords is not consistent with Duclert's ethnicist grid theory. However, this over-representation could only dramatically increase divergences between Hutu and Tutsi, and the conflictuality of the situation : as soon as this increase in divergences became apparent, from a cindynic standpoint it was obviously absolutely necessary to send in large UN peacekeeping forces. But, in compliance with Clinton's PDD-25⁵⁹ classified directive, Madeleine Albright persistently thwarted UN peacekeeping operations, as former French Prime

Minister Edouard Balladur mentioned it. This is how the International Community let the genocide plan thrive, and this illustrates the paramount importance of the cindynic notion of divergence.

The forecasting power of divergences lies in the observation of ideal situations – which, as a matter of fact, are *real, existing* estimates – seeking transformations that are not yet real objectives : this enables early analysis and warning, ‘*en amont*’, long before weak signals such as real actions or objectives can be detected. For example, the main theories of International Relations (Realism/Neorealism, or Idealism/Neoliberalism) were unable to predict the collapse of the USSR, and cannot explain it *a posteriori*, because they failed to consider the pivotal role of people's ideals. A cindynic approach, on the other hand, would first and foremost observe people's ideal situations, which in this case were quite clear and simple : “we want out”. The only practical difficulty in this analysis would have been to find out what people really thought.

Then a KGB agent, Putin was traumatized by the collapse of the Soviet bloc, which turned out to be the result of divergent public opinion, and another collapse for the same reasons could today be his worst nightmare, which in turn explains the control of the media, the manipulation of information, and the killing of journalists in Russia (and also in Africa) today, which can be described as a set of means used to minimize divergences in order to cement his regime.

From now on, as the English word ‘power’ cannot distinguish between potestas/pouvoir and potentia/puissance, the English word ‘power’ is only used when it means puissance, otherwise the French word ‘pouvoir’ will be used instead.

Insurrection potential and revolution theory, manipulation and destabilization

The notion of divergence notably enables us to better describe the dynamics of revolutions or insurrections : classically, frustration theory or Davies' J-curve consider that revolutions are triggered when the gap between people's expectations and perceived reality exceeds a certain threshold. From a cindynic standpoint, this gap is described by subjectively perceived deficits, which would mean that insurrections are triggered when these deficits exceed a threshold. But, as insurrections are obviously non-consensual situations, we have to consider a spectrum, at least roughly with two actors : the people and the *pouvoir* (i.e. the *pouvoir* actor). This highlights the divergences between the people and the *pouvoir*, which are necessary for an insurrection to occur : the day a *pouvoir* is toppled by the people and a new *pouvoir* is instated, the people's deficits are exactly the same the next day, and this obviously does not trigger a new insurrection. Thus an insurrection could not be triggered without divergences, which suggests defining a cindynic insurrection potential as a function increasing with people's relative deficits *and* divergences between the people and the *pouvoir*.

This explains destabilization operations, for instance in Africa : to increase an insurrection potential, or the propensity to topple a *pouvoir* in order, for instance to instate a pro-Russian *pouvoir* that will provide supporting votes at the UN, it is necessary to increase deficits and divergences. Increasing people's deficits can be done in two ways : by manipulating their perceived reality, or perspective, or manipulating their ideals, or prospective. Increasing divergences can be done by manipulating people's prospective (as previously for deficits) or, more deviously, by manipulating their perception of the *pouvoir*'s prospective, for instance by painting its agenda as a hidden plan to help France exploit them or supply weapons to terrorist groups. Consequently, the fact that divergence crafting, largely facilitated by the expansion of cyberspace and state operated troll farms, has now become a major strategic threat should no longer be overlooked.

2.3 Disparities

Operationally, reducing divergences is not an easy process, although doable, but it has probably no chances of success if observers have different perceptions of a real situation from the start. A first step before attempting to reduce divergences is thus to achieve a common diagnostic or perception of the situation. Disparities (4.2) are defined as these differences between observers' perspectives.

The previous cases provided some examples of disparities, for instance in historiography, which can have present-day geopolitical consequences : the absence of testimonies in the Duclert report on the genocide in Rwanda, that were mentioned in the Quilès report, which undermines Duclert ethnicist grid theory. Or the absence of any mention of the PDD-25 directive in the Duclert report is also a disparity compared with other historical studies, which mention it, thus providing more comprehensive and enlightening explanations by disclosing the Clinton Administration's pivotal responsibility. Interestingly, the cindynic analysis even enables the discovery of a disparity⁶⁰ between the 12-member committee Duclert headed to write the report, and what Duclert declared to the media : while the report stated that the RPF regime had no political legitimacy⁶¹ since the RPF seizure of power was carried out by gun, Duclert declared to the media⁶² that the RPF was politically legitimate. Moreover, this claim is also inconsistent with the testimony of Paul Kagame himself, who made it crystal clear that he would never have been able to take power through elections⁶³, hence another disparity. In addition, media coverage of Duclert's claims regarding the RPF's political legitimacy led to a toxic value flow⁶⁴ : the fact is that the RPF took power militarily, not democratically, and to claim that this is politically legitimate can only induce African populations to consider military takeovers as legitimate. And this toxic value flow only fuels in Russian deception operations in West Africa, which notoriously seek to undermine fundamental democratic principles, for example when Prigozhin claimed it was the “time of the colonels”, unscrupulously conflating Goïta and Putin with Che Guevara, and calling for coups, obviously pro-Russian ones. And today, these flows of anti-democratic values are thriving in what is henceforth known as the “coup belt”, notably in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, and irradiating a sub-region that had not experienced such a frequency of coups since the times of independence. And subsequently, there is a risk that the mere perception by leaders of the sub-regional countries of the threat of a Russian-guided coup may have an impact on votes at the UN.

2.4 Power

As a spectrum represents a field of potential or ongoing, possibly divergent, transformations sought by different observers, this raises the question of which transformation will ultimately prevail : the cindynic notion of power (4.4) is defined as the capability of one observer to impose his transformation or prospective against those of other observers. This general definition includes and is consistent with Raymond Aron's definition⁶⁵ of political Power. This cindynic definition also entails that power is not absolute, but relative.

Operationally, the evolution of observers' power must be monitored at the same time as their prospective or ideal situation, since an observer will most often decide to launch a transformation only after having obtained the power to do so. This enables very early forecasting, since the evolution of power and prospective can be tracked long before a transformation is actually triggered. And theoretically, this means that a transformation cannot be an actor's real objective, and will never be it, unless he or it actually gets the necessary power, if possible or even conceivable, and this has fundamental theoretical consequences.

2.5 Conflictuality, and its reduction

The conflictuality of a spectrum (or, as second-order is implicit : of a situation), is defined not as the intensity of a conflict, but as the propensity of a spectrum of relative situations to trigger or fuel in antagonistic intentional transformations, which is a function increasing with divergences and disparities (4.3).

The aim of second-order Cindynics is to reduce conflictuality : having described disparities and divergences, it is possible to reduce this propensity by reducing disparities and divergences, in much the same way as first-order Cindynics enables the reduction of situations vulnerability (also a propensity) by reducing deficits and dissonances. Reducing conflictuality notably enables observers to reach a consensus, which is necessary before any risk management preventive operation (ITO). Georges-Yves Kervern has often described this negotiation process, but first-order Cindynics had not for-

mally described it with MRC : second-order Cindynics provide MRC descriptions of this process and extend their area of application to conflicts. And this MRCization of negotiation processes is linked to the Mugur-Schächterian notion of objectivity as inter-subjective consensus : second-order models describe precisely an absence of inter-subjective consensus, and the reduction of conflictuality is notably a means of achieving or tending to achieve such a consensus. Nevertheless, it should be noted that second-order Cindynics do not at all call for a systematic and generalized reduction of all disparities between actors, since, firstly, this would be impossible to achieve in practice and, secondly, a world without disparities would be a world where everyone has the same perception, which would be a dystopian totalizing world devoid of standpoint diversity. Reducing disparities is only needed to reduce conflictuality in specific situations.

These specific situations fall within the three fields of application of second-order Cindynics : risk and disaster prevention, socioeconomic development efficiency, and conflict reduction or resolution, which are frequently intertwined, notably in Africa. At the lower end of the conflictuality continuum, conflictuality reduction is a necessary step before implementing a risk prevention operation. The generalization of the notion of transformation means that socioeconomic development actions can be considered as transformation operations, and in this case, reducing conflictuality can help improve operational efficiency. And at the upper end of the conflictuality continuum, conflictuality reduction enables conflict resolution or prevention, including conflicts trespassing beyond the military domain. Interestingly, these three fields also cover four of the five “Ps” of sustainable development : Planet and Population (prevention of environmental and human risks), Peace (conflict prevention or resolution), and Prosperity (development efficiency).

Mastering propensities : mutations of the shì 勢 concept

Having described the mastery of cindynic propensities, i.e. of vulnerability and conflictuality, it may seem interesting to consider a historical perspective highlighting how this notion, which is the antithesis of statistical or macro-quantitative approaches, has followed an evolution whose logic is best explained when pictured as a three-beat conceptual hack :

First beat : to craft victory, Sun Tzu hacked the Taoist shì 勢. The Dao De Jing merely described 勢 as what completes, makes becoming or happening : “道生之 · 德畜之 · 物形之 · 勢成之” (Dào 道 gives life, virtue 德 raises, matter gives form 形, shì 勢 makes becoming). If not historically, at least from a logical standpoint, Sun Tzu exploited the shì concept to become the one who decides what will become or happen, specifically : on a battlefield. For Sun Tzu, 勢 is not just propensity or what makes happening, it is the mastery of propensity exploited as a strategic instrument to control fate.

Second beat : to craft resilience, Georges-Yves Kervern exploited Sun Tzu’s shì 勢, which is now better apprehended thanks to François Jullien’s deciphering of The Art of War. By describing vulnerability as a propensity that can be attrited by reducing deficits and dissonances, first-order Cindynics exploited Sun Tzu’s shì – originally conceived to craft military victories – to prevent damage, incidents or disasters, and craft resilience.

Third beat : to craft peace (and operational efficiency), second-order Cindynics exploited the concept of situation propensity mastering. By describing conflictuality as the propensity of a spectrum of relative situations to generate antagonistic transformations, which can be attrited by reducing divergences and disparities, second-order Cindynics exploited the cindynic concept of propensity mastering – originally conceived to craft resilience – to prevent conflicts and craft peace.

And incidentally, this means that while Sun Tzu sought victory, Relativized Cindynics seek peace. And by providing conceptual and operational instruments for “winning the peace”, they precisely offer a direct response to an urgent need repeatedly voiced by French strategists⁶⁶.

Thus, exactly as 勢 is the pivotal concept of The Art of War, and was used both for strategic analysis and conducting operations millennia ago in China, the mastery of propensities, thus of changes, is the pivotal concept of first and second-

order Cindynics, and is designed to be used both for strategic analysis and for conducting intentional or generalized transformation operators. And this pivotal cindynic concept, stemming from a multi-millennial concept, has been circumspectly constructed, step by step, with MRC. Incidentally, behind the mere current meaning of the word 勢 (power, circumstances, posture), the shì 勢 concept is still used today in the People's Republic of China, for example to refine the calculation of state power⁶⁷.

2.6 Legitimacy diagonal and diversity

A spectrum diagram can highlight a diagonal of legitimacy, representing the transformations that actors seek to apply to themselves, which is legitimate, while the other transformations are those they seek to apply to other actors (in other words : conformations) which on, the other hand, is of debatable legitimacy.

The concept of conflictuality is so to speak a negative concept, which can be hollowed out to describe the positive concept of diversity (4.5). The first condition of diversity is the existence of non-cindynogenic differences between actors, or variances (2.4). The second condition is that an actor observing these differences accept them, in other words : considers them to be ideal. These ideal non cindynogenic differences are described as tolerances (2.1'). And the last condition is that all observers in a spectrum agree to all tolerances, which requires that there are no divergences. Thus, for a set of relative situations to achieve diversity, both variances and tolerances must increase, and divergences must decrease. And this is closely linked to the notion of legitimacy diagonal, which highlights the fundamental question of the legitimacy of conformations that actors would impose on other actors. That being said, the cindynic notion of diversity extends well beyond the notion of absence of conflictuality, since we could theoretically conceive of a perfectly peaceful situation without any differences (variances) between actors, which, then again, would be a dystopian totalizing peace.

2.7 Power analysis

Methodological individualism

The question of attributing objectives to individual (1) or collective (1b) actors was a major issue in debates on methodological individualism during the Cold War era. In particular, two individualist posits were opposed to holist positions : $\alpha 1$) only an individual actor has objectives : a collective actor has no objectives⁶⁸; $\alpha 2$) a collective actor may have objectives, but people set them⁶⁹, not the collective.

With regard to $\alpha 2$, which is a posit upheld by Karl Popper, it can be argued simply that an individual actor does not set a collective actor's objective : barring exceptions, actual practice shows that it is a set of individual actors who collectively determine this collective objective through a consensus-building process that overcomes teleological dissonances or, in the case of a transformation objective, divergences between individual actors. Since this determination is almost always necessarily a collective process (as in democracy, and except in despotic regimes), can the $\alpha 2$ Popperian posit still be semantically considered individualist ?

Regardless of the debate over who or what determines collective actors' objectives, for its part, the $\alpha 1$ posit – upheld by Agassi – can be seen as being in contradiction with Cindynics, which for practical reasons must simply consider collective actors such as enterprises, or any private or public organization : these collective actors actually have objectives, particularly statutory objectives (which may moreover be a legal obligation) which are precisely described by the teleologic dimension of the cindynic space. Relativized Cindynics suggest to monitor actors' power and prospective, as a means to detect weak signals *ex-ante* : this is based on the fact that an actor that does not have the power to achieve a transformation is unlikely to initiate it, and will wait to get the necessary power before making any attempt to do so. Frequently, individual actors will form collective actors, or collective actors will try to recruit more individual actors to build power,

which is old as the hills. The point is that in real life, many transformations requires a power that only collective actors can get, and that individuals will never obtain. Which means that a collective actor will be able to have the objective to achieve such a transformation, but an individual actor will never be able to have this objective : in MRC terms, this collective objective aspect-view simply does not exist⁷⁰ with respect to any individual actor entity. Thus, from a cindynic standpoint, which essentially considers simply practical cases, not only collective actors do have objectives, but they can even have objectives that no individual actor could ever have, unless real objectives are conflated with figmental ones.

Self-organizing systems, chaos and democracy

The Hayekian doctrine is underpinned by the postulate that self-organized systems are better at managing economic information than organized systems, where ‘organized’ in this case means centralized systems, or politico-economic systems in which a government or legislator sets rules for economic operators. From a cindynic standpoint, what Hayek called a self-organizing system is formally described as a spectrum, a set of actors each with his own power, defined as his ability to impose the transformation he seeks on the other actors. In a spectrum where the conflictuality is not null, the evolution of its organization depends on relative powers, and, by the very definition of cindynic power, the result will be that the actors with the most power will organize the situation, and the other actors will be organized, whatever their number. Thus, a cindynic second-order analysis of this dynamic process enables the deconstruction of what is hidden behind the Hayekian understanding of ‘self-organizing system’.

This process is the core of Hayekian cosmology, where a ‘spontaneous’ organization or ‘order’ emerging from ‘self-organization’ is called ‘cosmos’, but requires an initial ‘chaos’ : an absence of rules, which requires a deregulation. While in a democracy, the people decide how to organize themselves, in Hyaekian cosmology, a demiurge (*δημιουργός*) composed of the few most powerful actors decides how to ‘self-organize’ the artificial chaos that results from deregulation, on the grounds that such ‘self-organization’ is a beneficial economic Darwinism that eliminates the least efficient actors. Obviously, on the one hand, democracy is not a perfect system as soon as a ‘democratic’ majority understands democracy as a right to oppress minorities. For instance in Mali, where the Tuareg, who account for only a few percent of the population, are struggling to have their political rights recognized, and have been suffering military repression for decades, which is a consequence of the borders drawn by the colonial powers. Moreover, this issue played an important role in sparking the current Sahelian crisis, and this explains why the Malian military junta has bought Russian mercenaries agreeing to resolve the Tuareg question militarily, which, incidentally, is possibly not unrelated to ethnicism issues. But on the other hand, whatever its purported economic efficiency, Hayekian economic Darwinism has one consequence in particular : socioeconomic Darwinism, which can be life-threatening, for instance when it comes to healthcare.

Such a Darwinian thinking had a Kafkaesque consequence in 2015, when Martin Shkreli, owner of Turing Pharmaceuticals, decided to increase the price of Daraprim, a drug used by HIV patients and prescribed for the treatment of toxoplasmosis (which is a major cause of death from food-borne illness in the United States⁷¹), by 5000 % : the price was raised from \$13.50 a tablet to \$750. Confronted with critics, Shkreli argued that Daraprim could save your life for \$50,000, adding “at this price, it’s a no-brainer”⁷². Then a presidential candidate, Hillary Clinton pledged to take measures against this proceeding, which also reflected that it was not illegal in the USA : the etiology of such a situation stems from a thinking that could be disguised as science, but is rooted in an axiological degeneracy focusing on liberty and blind to human solidarity.

Hybrid spectrum and the construction (or destruction) of collective

Building collective actors (*1b*) is the oldest and most obvious way for individuals to gain or increase power : this process can be described by hybrid spectrums, defined as a spectrums mixing different analysis scales by including both individual actors and collective actors. This type of spectrum was originally designed for strategic analysis, where most

of the actors are, for example, states, but which often has to take into account specific individuals, such as strategic leaders. However, it can also be used as a first step in describing the dynamic process of building collectives, mobilizations or alliances. The rallying of individual actors depends on a shared diagnosis of the situation they face, i.e. on the similarity of their deficit estimates, and on minimal divergences. Once a collective is created, it has its own prospective : recruiting new individuals then depends on the absence or scarcity of divergences between the individual recruits' prospectives and the existing collective prospective. Which brings up two issues : protecting diversity within a collective, i.e. insuring the existence of minimal disparities and divergences, which enables it to avoid nefarious group thinking and its consequences towards outside actors, and a classical threat, namely that a hostile actor can increase divergences within a collective to weaken or even destroy it.

An example of divergence crafting : if a formerly collapsed state has weak power, and is seeking to regain its place on the international stage while lacking the means to increase its own relative power, the only – and cost-effective – solution left is to weaken its opponent's relative power by weakening it from the inside : for example, by meddling in a presidential campaign with an army of trolls to fuel in racism, and craft divergences and conflictuality within the society. Interestingly, destabilization operations have also been formalized by Russian social scientists, who have theorized that the more money fed into opposition movements in a targeted country, the greater the number of opposition movements and destabilizing agitation. And this in turn raises a new question : would it be really axiologically reasonable to accept or try to defend such hostile toxic operations – or their media – in the name of freedom of expression or freedom of the press, or by simply claiming to be a 'free speech absolutist' ?

3 third order : matrix and the perception of power

3.1 Relativity of spectrum observation

By describing sets of possibly antagonistic potential or ongoing transformations sought by different observers, spectrums are the first cindynic level of strategic description, and the underpinning descriptions of second-order Cindynics. If I am a strategic leader, analyzing a situation composed of potential allies, and opponents, each with its own prospective and perception, I observe a spectrum : it seems difficult to deny that other strategic leaders are able to, and will, do the same. And they will probably not see exactly this set of relative situations the same way I do : spectrums are relative to observers (in this case called spectrum observers or 's-observers'), hence the description of a set of relative spectrums, observed by different s-observers. Such a set is defined as a matrix (5) (of relative spectrums) and is the underpinning description of third-order Cindynics. While a matrix is therefore a theoretical construct that easily emerges logically, in practice, its observation may often be fragmentary, as a comprehensive observation would require uncommon information gathering capabilities. Nevertheless, it still remains an advanced strategic analysis tool, and enables an in-depth description of the dynamics of power perception, notably in fluid situations.

3.2 Power perception in Revolution theories

In the field of Revolution theory, James Coleman considers⁷³ two categories of theories : frustration theory, based on the expectations of populations, and power theory, based on the perception of power. In a nutshell : Coleman noticed an anomaly in frustration theory, namely that revolution can occur even if individual's conditions are improving. A cindynic answer to this question is that deficits are not sufficient to trigger a revolution, and that significant divergence with a *pouvoir* are necessary, while the notion of divergence is absent of frustration theories. However, Coleman noted that power theories – which he upholds – are not confronted with this anomaly since they focus primarily on the role of revolutionary actors and explain the outbreak or success of a revolution by power perception : revolutionary actors will act if they think they can succeed, and other actors will join them only if they believe these revolutionary actors can win, which means that revolutionary leaders have to make people believe they are powerful. And this is exactly this dynamics

that power distortions in a matrix, defined as the differences between observers' power estimated by different s-observers (5.1), describe. Thus, second-order and third-order descriptions reunite and outreach frustration theory and power theory by considering relative deficits, divergences, and power distortion dynamics.

3.3 Power perception and the dynamics of coups

The dynamics of subjective perceptions of power also appear to play a pivotal role in determining the success or failure of coup attempts. This question has notably been explored by Naunihal Singh⁷⁴, who has investigated the history of coups in Ghana and managed to interview the key actors involved in half a dozen coups. One of his main findings is that the leading officers, who had to choose sides when coups were attempted, did not take their personal convictions into account, but above all considered the safety of their troops and sought to avoid any bloodshed. Consequently, they went for the side they deemed most likely to win, in other words : the most powerful. This suggests that if an ECOWAS operation had been swiftly launched in Niger to reinstate President Bazoum, many key Nigerian officers would have switched to the ECOWAS side. This also highlight one reason of the failure of Obiang's coup in Libreville, as he made the mistake of calling in civilians for help⁷⁵, thereby exposing his weakness, and convincing key officers to remain loyal. Thus, the dynamics of coups can be apprehended by considering a matrix composed of the relative spectrums of the key officers facing a coup attempt, where each officer is an observer with his own assessment of the actors' power.

3.4 Power perception, mobilization dynamics, and deception

Thus, a general pattern emerges whatever the field, underlining the pivotal role of the evolution of power distortions in a matrix describing any attempt to trigger a dynamic intended at uniting actors, i.e. creating a collective involving individual or collective actors, whether occasionally for a particular project or event, or on a permanent basis. Most leaders who have tried to mobilize collective actors know how tough this can be, since at the beginning of this process, many invited actors will decline, even if they have no divergence with the mobilization project : at this initial stage, the few actors having joined the project appear to represent only limited power, leading some invited actors to consider that the project will fail. Later, these actors may rejoin the project once the number of actors having joined has swelled enough and provided sufficient apparent power. As in coups or revolutions, most actors will join you when they believe you are powerful.

Russian deception operations in Africa manipulate this perception of power to engineer actual mobilization from fake mobilization : in real life, by paying demonstrators to join rallies, or by filming a few paid demonstrators so narrowly that spectators think they are watching a large gathering. And on the social media, these operations also target ethnic groups in countries south of the Sahel by selecting names that enable trolls to appear to belong to a given ethnic group, so that others in that group think there is a mobilization within their own group. These trolls, whether working in Russia or on troll farms in Accra, Lagos, or Bangui, are easily unmasked by being addressed in the native language they should speak, but actually do not know.

Epilogue

Given its conceptual rooting in fundamental universal values, Neosituationism tackles a wide range of issues and fields relating to the protection of people (life, health, peace, fundamental rights) and the environment. Key issues relating to the environment are, for instance : disaster prevention and natural hazard, environmental protection, climate change... And relating to people : conflict reduction, safety, peace and diversity, access to healthcare and treatment (drug patents), human rights and civil liberties, democratic principles, and informational risk and threats... In particular, many issues directly stem from technology and innovation, along with their use and regulation, which leads to a vast archipel-

ago of neo-threats, such as : a) AI, facial recognition and autonomous killing machines, neural interfaces or implants, autonomous vehicles, cyberphysical systems ; b) techno-surveillance (geolocation and tracking, genetic databases, data retention, data capitalism, cyber or mobile eavesdropping...) and confidential data disclosure ; c) access to information and knowledge, software patents, freedom of speech and of the press (Big Tech censorship power, Internet filtering, state censorship...) ; d) deception (deepfakes, state-sponsored exogenous or indigenous troll farms, perception manipulation and Russian hybrid warfare or Qiao & Wang's war beyond limits...). That being said, as long as this list may seem, it is actually far from being comprehensive, and is constantly expanding, as technological evolution is a never-ending process that is perpetually inducing new deficits, dissonances, disparities and divergences, hence the emergence of new perils and inexperience. All these issues are seen as falling within a continuum ranging from unintentional risks to intentional threats⁷⁶, directly reflecting the fact that conflictuality is itself a continuum.

Moreover, this set of issues corresponds to four 'Ps' of the UN sustainable development agenda⁷⁷ : people, planet, peace, prosperity. But with a major conceptual difference, namely that conflictuality is a pivotal notion in Relativized Cindynics : whereas first-order models aim to reduce vulnerability, second-order models aim to reduce conflictuality, which basically means that from a cindynic standpoint, conflictuality is not an optional notion. On the other hand, among UN sustainable development goals, SDG 16 (peace) almost didn't make it onto the UN agenda. Then, a 2018 UN report concluded that the other SDGs could not be fully achieved because conflicts were impeding them, in other words, without achieving SDG 16. But while the UN confirmed this afterwards, Relativized Cindynics have from the start described conflictuality reduction as a necessary prerequisite for any vulnerability reduction, which is precisely their very origin. In addition, cindynic conflictuality is not confined to conflicts in the classical sense of the term, but is a pervasive phenomenon that impacts on all human activities beyond war, including development operations : this notion therefore encompasses UN SDG 16 and pervades the other SDGs.

Rooting Neosituationism in universal values may seem inconsistent with its relativist approach, as Relativized Cindynics concepts and descriptions emerged from the relativization of observations and ideals (first, with the relativization of situations, which underpins spectrums and second-order descriptions, and second, with the relativization of spectrums, which underpins matrices and third-order descriptions), which thus includes axiological relativism. Even so, there is unquestionably nothing to preclude universal values and most relative values from coexisting. More precisely, Neosituationism proscribes only the relative values that are cindynogenic or incompatible with universal values : for example, the restriction of women's rights and the denial of gender equality, the prohibition of free thought or belief, and theocracy. Therefore, Neosituationism is plainly incompatible with these illegitimate coercive tenets and with the Cairo Declaration on Human Rights, and defends both universal rights and diversity.

Regarding epistemology, the Neosituationism approach is twice constructivist : first, by constructing its concepts and models, what is more with MRC which itself is a constructivist and phenomenological conceptualization method, and second, by describing social constructs and dynamics with these models. In addition, Neosituationism is only proscriptive, not prescriptive and not severable from the cindynic method, which is free to use and enables users to co-construct, co-prescribe and co-implement any transformation that complies with universal values or is intended to uphold them. This approach is opposed to positivist stances and enables their deconstruction. In addition cindynic descriptions must be seen as descriptive kernels that can be freely extended with MRC to better fit each specific situation, which at the same time enables an optimized fitting providing a greater operational efficiency, and offers kernel descriptions constituting a common language which is needed to cope with complex situations where issues involving different fields, cultures and categories of actors are interwoven. Neosituationism can be viewed as a transversal thinking allowing actors to escape from vertical silos that notably lead to what Edgar Morin calls "high cretinization". This transversal thinking is therefore orthogonal to Cartesian mindsets, that cannot help but split up deeply intertwined issues, which in practice can lead not to help to find solutions, but rather to conceal them. Which, incidentally, is exactly what can happen with logical frameworks when carving out a sub-problem from a tree at the end of a problem tree analysis, not to mention the fact that a

tree structure in itself might be a simplistic representation that already conceals the rhizomatic topology of complex problems, and therefore possibly their solutions.

Neosituationism is an action-oriented thinking that can be translated into action using the cindynic method, which enables both strategic analysis of situations and the conduct of transformation operations. Kernel descriptions may seem complicated at first, but the basics can be quickly grasped, and only a few diagrams (Figure 2) are needed to visualize and memorize the first-, second-, and third-order kernels. Once apprehended, these kernels can be seen as a kind of conceptual Rubik's cube that can be freely and easily used for strategic analysis or the conduct of operations. Though the chronological or historical order of these descriptions is first-, second-, and third-order, an organization or a set of organizations must follow an operational order that is different : when they are faced with any situation, they should initially use the second-order kernel, then the first-order can only be used if there is no conflictuality, and the third order – which requires far more time and information gathering capabilities – can be used, if needed, for complex situations or when the perception of power plays a significant role. A set of spectrums each associated to a specific identified issue (called a synthetic matrix) and its evolution enable a strategic analysis by identifying the actors involved and the transformations they seek for each spectrum : while SWOT analysis takes into account positive or negative internal and external factors, and its ancestor SOFT considers positive or negative present and future factors, a synthetic matrix takes into account the resilience or vulnerability of each actor, as well as the positive or negative transformations they are seeking (Figure 8), whether ongoing or future⁷⁸. While SWOT analysis are frequently not used once achieved⁷⁹, a synthetic matrix is intended to enable a collective actor to then use it operationally for monitoring and controlling the identified transformations, essentially by monitoring, emitting or controlling inter-actor immaterial flows. These operations also include the reduction of his own vulnerability (notably due to not so uncommon deficits such as legislative or technological watch shortcomings, lack of knowledge on specific issues, lack of internal communication, or strategic priorities degeneracy...) or internal conflictuality. Here again, second-order descriptions provide a common language for strategic analysis and the conduct of operations, enabling freedom of use and agility.

Information and knowledge are thus essential to mastering transformations : in particular – in Boydian terms – to increase awareness and understanding, and to orient and trigger action and mobilization. And this brings up the deepest issue that faces Neosituationism : determining the boundaries of deception and perception manipulation. The protection of people and environment, grounded in universal values, requires proselytism and mobilization, in other words, a war of position that Antonio Gramsci equated⁸⁰ with hegemony. Yet, war of position can share several common features with information operations in hybrid warfare, which underlines the need for criteria to characterize deception and perception manipulation, among which lying is an obvious criterion, but cannot be the only one, as it would be *naïve* to omit the more devious ways used in these operations, particularly the ones sponsored by states. In his prison notebooks, Gramsci considered two categories⁸¹ of societies : societies in fluid state (*'stato di fluidità'*) where citizen associations are scarce, and institutions and civil society are weakly interrelated, and more complex massive societies (*'massicci'*), where these organizations are more developed and interrelated, and where change therefore requires wars of position. Today, with the expansion of cyberspace and the emergence of hybrid warfare, societies are no longer fluid or massive, they are becoming manipulated societies where the *Spectacle* pervasively tends to supersede the real world. One of the main goals of Neosituationism is therefore to reduce *naïveté* and increase the resilience of the informationally vulnerable populations that are targeted by deception operations, and the deconstruction of these operations. In other words : fostering emancipation from a mind enslavement that may not be so innovative, but is expanding dramatically at the present time with the democratization of access to cyberspace and the proliferation of hybrid warfare operations that use people's brains as a battlefield. Notably on the African continent, where this has deadly consequences.

Pascal Cohet
V1d3 September 24, 2023

Annex 1 : A synoptic overview of first- to third-order cindynic kernels




Figure 2: Cindynic kernel descriptions

Annex 2 : cindynic MRC descriptions

0 Basic elements and their structuration

(0) Infra-actor **element** $\theta_{\omega_n}^0 / G_{\omega_n}^0, \alpha_{\omega_n}^0, V_{\omega_n}^0 /$, where :

- $\alpha_{\omega_n}^0$ is an element n whose nature ω can be : data/facts (s), models/knowledge (e), goals (t), rules(n), or values(a),
- $V_{\omega_n}^0 \equiv \{Vg_{\omega_n}^0\}$ a view composed of only one aspect-view receiving the measure of the element n of nature ω ,

(-1) **Sub-element** $\theta_{\omega_{n_m}}^{-1} / G_{\omega_{n_m}}^{-1}, \alpha_{\omega_{n_m}}^{-1}, V_{\omega_{n_m}}^{-1} /$, a view $V_{\omega_{n_m}}^0 \equiv \{Vg_{\omega_{n_m}}^0\}$ composed of only one aspect-view receiving the measure of the sub-element m of the element n of nature ω .

Analysis of an element $\theta_{\omega_n}^0 / G_{\omega_n}^0, \alpha_{\omega_n}^0, V_{\omega_n}^0 /$ into sub-elements :

- $\alpha_{\omega_n}^0 \equiv \{\theta_{\omega_{n_1}}^{-1}, \theta_{\omega_{n_2}}^{-1}, \dots, \theta_{\omega_{n_{N(n)}}}^{-1}\}$ if this element is *composed* of N(n) sub-elements,
- or $\alpha_{\omega_n}^0 \equiv \{\alpha_{\omega_{n_{asc}}}^0, \theta_{\omega_{n_1}}^{-1}, \theta_{\omega_{n_2}}^{-1}, \dots, \theta_{\omega_{n_{N(n)}}}^{-1}\}$ if this ancestor element $\alpha_{\omega_{n_{asc}}}^0$ *contains* N(n) sub-elements.

Recursively, this analysis enables the description of arborescent structures in Hyperspace dimensions.

1 First order

(1) **Real actor** $\theta^1 / G^1, \alpha^1 \equiv (\theta_{\omega_1}^0, \dots, \theta_{N(\omega)}^0), V^1 /$ where $\omega \in \{s, e, t, n, a\}$, a view $V^1 \equiv \{V_H^1, V_\rho^1, \dots\}$ is composed of sub-views :

- (1.1) Real Hyperspace V_H^1 , composed of five subviews $V_{H\omega}^1 \equiv \{Vg_{\omega_n}^0, \forall n\}$ (Hyperspace dimensions),
- (1.2) Inter-aspect relationships (real) $\rho \equiv V_\rho^1 \equiv \{\rho(Vg_{\alpha_n}^0, Vg_{\beta_m}^0)\} \forall \alpha, \beta, n \sim m$ between elements $Vg_{\alpha_n}^0$ and $Vg_{\beta_m}^0$ in dimensions α and β , or $V_\rho^1 \equiv \{Vg_{\alpha_n / \beta_m}^1\}$.




Figure 3: Cindynic space (or “hyperspace”) describing an actor

- (2) Real situation (**perspective**) $\theta^2/G^2, \alpha^2 \equiv (\theta_1^1, \dots, \theta_p^1), V^2/$, a view $V^2 \equiv \{V_\delta^2, V_{\delta_\rho}^2, V_\varphi^2\}$ is composed of subviews :
- (2.1) Dissonances $\delta \equiv V_\delta^2 \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n^i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m^j}^0), i \neq j, \forall n \sim m, \omega \in \{s, e, t, n, a\}\}$ between cindynogenic counterparts of two real actors actors i and j,
 - (2.2) Relational dissonances δ_ρ
 - (2.3) Real flows $\varphi \equiv V_\varphi^2 \equiv \{\varphi(Vg_{\omega_n^i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m^j}^0), \forall i \neq j, n \sim m, \omega \in \{s, e, t, n, a\}\}$ composed of element flows from a dimension ω of a real actor i to that of a real actor j, or $V_\varphi^2 \equiv \{Vg_{\omega_{n/m}^2}^2\}$.

(1') Ideal actor $\theta^1/G^1, \alpha^1 \equiv (\theta_{\omega_1}^0, \dots, \theta_{\omega_{N(\omega)}}^0), V^1/$, a view $V^1 \equiv \{V_H^1, V_\rho^1, \dots\}$ is composed of subviews :

- (1.1') Ideal Hyperspace $V_H^1 \equiv \{V_{H\omega}^1\}$, where $V_{H\omega}^1 \equiv \{Vg_{\omega_n}^0\}$
- (1.2') Ideal Relationships $\rho' \equiv V_\rho^1 \equiv \{\rho(Vg_{\alpha_n}^0, Vg_{\beta_m}^0)\}$ or $V_\rho^1 \equiv \{Vg_{\alpha_n/\beta_m}^1\}$.

(2') Ideal situation (**prospective**) $\theta^2/G^2, \alpha^2 \equiv (\theta_1^1, \dots, \theta_p^1), V^2/$, a view $V^2 \equiv \{V_\delta^2, V_{\delta_\rho}^2, V_\varphi^2\}$ is composed of subviews :

- (2.1') Tolerances $\delta' \equiv V_\delta^2 \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n^i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m^j}^0)\}$ between non-cindynogenic counterparts of two ideal actors i and j,
- (2.2') Relational tolerances δ'_ρ ,
- (2.3') Ideal flows $\varphi' \equiv V_\varphi^2 \equiv \{\varphi(Vg_{\omega_n^i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m^j}^0)\}$ composed of element flow from the dimension ω of an ideal actor i to that of an ideal actor j, or $V_\varphi^2 \equiv \{Vg_{\omega_{n/m}^2}^2\}$.




Figure 4: Cindynic situation : deficits and dissonances

(3) **Situation** $\theta^3/G^3, \alpha^3 \equiv (\theta^2, \theta'^2), V^3/$, a view $V^3 \equiv \{\Delta_s, \Delta_t, \Delta_\rho, \Delta_\varphi, V, \{V_i\}\}$ is composed of subviews :

- (3.1) Systemic deficits $\Delta_s \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n i}^0, Vg_{\omega_n i}^0), \forall \omega, n, i\} \equiv \{\Delta_{sk}, \Delta_{sa}\}$ composed of :

value deficits $\Delta_{sk} \equiv \{\delta(gk_{\omega_n i}^0, gk_{\omega_n i}^0)\}$, (where 'value' means the measured value of an aspect whatever its nature)

and aspectual deficits $\Delta_{sa} \equiv \{\delta_a(Vg_{\omega_n i}^0, Vg_{\omega_n i}^0)\}$,

- (3.2) Relational deficits $\Delta_\rho \equiv \{\delta(\rho(Vg_{\alpha_n i}^0, Vg_{\beta_m i}^0), \rho(Vg_{\alpha_n i}^0, Vg_{\beta_m i}^0)), \forall i, \alpha \neq \beta, n \sim m\}$, or $\Delta_\rho \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\alpha_n \beta_m i}^1, Vg_{\alpha_n \beta_m i}^1)\}$,

- (3.3) Dynamic deficits $\Delta_\varphi \equiv \{\delta(\varphi(Vg_{\omega_n i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m j}^0), \varphi(Vg_{\omega_n i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m j}^0)), \forall i, j, \omega, n \sim m\}$, or $\Delta_\varphi \equiv \delta(\{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}, \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\})$,

(3.3.1) Disclosing flows ($\exists \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}, \exists \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}$) harming the source

(3.3.2) Suppressed flows ($\exists \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}, \exists \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}$) where the suppression is harming the source or receiver

(3.3.3) Toxic flows ($\exists \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}, \exists \{Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^2\}$) where the existing flow is deceptive or harming the target

- (3.4) Topological deficits, $\Delta_t \equiv \delta(G^2, G'^2) \equiv \delta(\{\alpha_i^1\}, \{\alpha_i^1\})$

- (3.5) Vulnerability (of a situation) $V \equiv f(\Delta_s, \Delta_t, \Delta_\rho, \Delta_\varphi, \delta, \delta_\rho)$ and Resilience (of a situation) $R \equiv 1/V$.

- (3.6) Vulnerability of an actor i $V_i \equiv f_i(\Delta_s, \Delta_t, \Delta_\rho, \Delta_\varphi, \delta, \delta_\rho)$ and Resilience of an actor i $R_i \equiv 1/V_i$.

2 Second order

(4) **spectrum** $\theta^4/G^4, (\theta^{3/1}, \dots, \theta^{3/N}), V^4/$, a view $V^4 \equiv \{\Lambda_s, \Lambda_\rho, \Lambda_t, \Lambda_\varphi, \nabla_s, \nabla_\rho, \nabla_t, \nabla_\varphi, C, P \equiv \{P^i\}\}$ is composed of the following subviews :

- (4.1) Divergences :

(4.1.1) systemic $\nabla_s \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/h}, Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/k}) \forall i, j, \omega, k, n\}$,

(4.1.2) relational $\nabla_\rho \equiv \{\delta(\rho(Vg_{\alpha_n i}^{0/h}, Vg_{\beta_m i}^{0/h}), \rho(Vg_{\alpha_n i}^{0/k}, Vg_{\beta_m i}^{0/k})), \forall i, \alpha \neq \beta, n \sim m\}$

(4.1.3) dynamic $\nabla_\varphi \equiv \{\delta(\varphi(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/h}, Vg_{\omega_m j}^{0/h}), \varphi(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/k}, Vg_{\omega_m j}^{0/k})), \forall h, i, j, k, \omega, n \sim m\}$ $\nabla_\varphi \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^{2/h}, Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^{2/k})\}$

(4.1.4) topological $\nabla_t \equiv \{\delta(G^{2/h}, G^{2/k})\} \equiv \delta(\{\alpha_i^{1/h}\}, \{\alpha_i^{1/k}\}), \forall i, h, k$,

- (4.2) Disparities :

(4.2.1) systemic $\Lambda_s \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/h}, Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/k})\}$,

(4.2.2) relational $\Lambda_\rho \equiv \{\delta(\rho(Vg_{\alpha_n i}^{0/h}, Vg_{\beta_m i}^{0/h}), \rho(Vg_{\alpha_n i}^{0/k}, Vg_{\beta_m i}^{0/k})), \forall i, \alpha \neq \beta, n \sim m\}$,

(4.2.3) dynamic $\Lambda_\varphi \equiv \{\delta(\varphi(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/h}, Vg_{\omega_m j}^{0/h}), \varphi(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0/k}, Vg_{\omega_m j}^{0/k}))\}$, or $\Lambda_\varphi \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^{2/h}, Vg_{\omega_{nm} ij}^{2/k})\}$

(4.2.4) topological $\Lambda_t \equiv \{\delta(G^{2/h}, G^{2/k})\} \equiv \delta(\{\alpha_i^{1/h}\}, \{\alpha_i^{1/k}\}), \forall i, h, k$,

- (4.3) Conflictuality $C \equiv f(\Lambda_s, \Lambda_\rho, \Lambda_t, \Lambda_\varphi, \nabla_s, \nabla_\rho, \nabla_t, \nabla_\varphi)$,

- (4.4) Power $P \equiv \{P^k\} \equiv \{V_p^{4/k}\}$.




Figure 5: spectrum : disparities and divergences




Figure 6: spectrum as a transformation field, and legitimacy diagonal

3 Third order




Figure 7: Matrix, power perception and distortions

(5) **Matrix** $\theta^5/G^5, (\theta^{4^1}, \dots, \theta^{4^M}), V^5/$, a view $V^5 \equiv \{\bar{d}_p, \bar{d}_{pr}, \bar{d}_{pe}, \dots, \bar{d}_c\}$ is composed of subviews :

- (5.1) Power distortions $\bar{d}_p \equiv \{\delta(P^{\lambda/k}, P^{\mu/k})\} \equiv \{\delta(V_p^{4\lambda/k}, V_p^{4\mu/k}), \forall k, \lambda \neq \mu\}$.

- (5.2) Prospective distortions $\bar{d}_{pr} \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0 \lambda/k}, Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0 \mu/k}), \forall \omega, n, i, \lambda, \mu, k\}$,

- (5.3) Perspective distortions $\bar{d}_{pe} \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0 \lambda/k}, Vg_{\omega_n i}^{0 \mu/k}), \forall \omega, n, i, \lambda, \mu, k\}$,

- (5.4) Divergences distortions \bar{d}_∇ :

(5.4.1) systemic $\bar{d}_{\nabla_s} \equiv \{\nabla_s^\lambda, \nabla_s^\mu\} \forall \lambda, \mu$

(5.4.2) relational $\bar{d}_{\nabla_\rho} \equiv \{\nabla_\rho^\lambda, \nabla_\rho^\mu\} \forall \lambda, \mu$

(5.4.3) dynamic $\bar{d}_{\nabla_\varphi} \equiv \{\nabla_\varphi^\lambda, \nabla_\varphi^\mu\} \forall \lambda, \mu$

- (5.5) Disparities distortions \bar{d}_Λ :

(5.5.1) systemic $\bar{d}_{\Lambda_s} \equiv \{\Lambda_s^\lambda, \Lambda_s^\mu\} \forall \lambda, \mu$

(5.5.2) relational $\bar{d}_{\Lambda_\rho} \equiv \{\Lambda_\rho^\lambda, \Lambda_\rho^\mu\} \forall \lambda, \mu$

(5.5.3) dynamic $\bar{d}_{\Lambda_\varphi} \equiv \{\Lambda_\varphi^\lambda, \Lambda_\varphi^\mu\} \forall \lambda, \mu$

- (5.6) Topological distortions $\bar{d}_t \equiv \{\bar{d}_{t_{vr}}, \bar{d}_{t_{ve}}\}$:

(5.6.1) between prospectives $\bar{d}_{t\ pr} \equiv \{\delta(\{\alpha_i^{1\ \lambda/k}\}, \{\alpha_i^{1\ \mu/k}\}), \forall i, \lambda, \mu, k\}$

(5.6.2) between perspectives $\bar{d}_{t\ pe} \equiv \{\delta(\{\alpha_i^{1\ \lambda/k}\}, \{\alpha_i^{1\ \mu/k}\}), \forall i, \lambda, \mu, k\}$

- (5.7) Conflictuality distortions $\bar{d}_C \equiv \{\delta(C^\lambda, C^\mu), \forall \lambda \neq \mu\}$.

4 Models extensions

4.1 Formalization of the notion of diversity

Perspective $\theta^2/G^2, \alpha^2 \equiv (\theta_1^1, \dots, \theta_p^1), V^2/$, a view $V^2 \equiv \{V_\delta^2, V_\phi^2, V_\sigma^2\}$ contains the subview :

- (2.4) Variances $\sigma \equiv V_\sigma^2 \equiv \{\delta(Vg_{\omega_n^i}^0, Vg_{\omega_m^j}^0), i \neq j, \forall n, m, \omega \in \{s, e, t, n, a\}\}$ between non-cindynogenic counterparts of two real actors i and j,

Spectrum $\theta^4/G^4, (\theta^{3/1}, \dots, \theta^{3/N}), V^4/$, a view $V^4 \equiv \{\Lambda_s, \Lambda_\rho, \Lambda_t, \Lambda_\phi, \nabla_s, \nabla_\rho, \nabla_t, \nabla_\phi, V_c^4, \{V_p^{4/k}\}, \mathcal{D}\}$ including :

- (4.5) **Diversity** $\mathcal{D} \equiv f(\{\sigma^{1/k}\}, \{\delta^{1/k}\}, 1/\nabla), \forall k$, a function increasing with variances and tolerances, and decreasing with divergences.

4.2 bottom-up construction of collective actors

An individual actor i is described (with an arbitrary chaining index 0) as : $D_{A_i}^0/G_{A_i}^0, \alpha_{A_i}^0 \dots V_{A_i}^0/$,

(Ib) A set of individual actors $\{D_{A_i}^0/G_{A_i}^0, \alpha_{A_i}^0 \dots V_{A_i}^0/\}$ enables the description of a **collective actor** :

$D_\Sigma^1/G_\Sigma^1, \alpha_\Sigma^1 = \{D_{A_1}^0, D_{A_2}^0, \dots, D_{A_N}^0\}, V_\Sigma^1/$, where V_Σ^1 is composed of :

- a set of views for each individual actor $\{V_{A_1}^0, V_{A_2}^0, \dots, V_{A_N}^0\}$

- and V_C^1 , a subview composed of view-aspects that does not exist in respect to each isolated individual actor.

A set of collective $\{D_\Sigma^1\}$ or individual $\{D_{A_i}^0\}$ actors enables the description of a collective actor in the same way :

$D_\Sigma^2/G_\Sigma^2, \alpha_\Sigma^2 = \{\{D_{A_i}^0\}, \{D_\Sigma^1\}\}, V_\Sigma^2/$, this process can be recursively applied.

4.3 Formalization of the notion of *pouvoir* over a collective actor

The relative situations $\theta^{3/\Sigma_i}/G^{3/\Sigma_i}, \alpha^{3/\Sigma_i}, V^{3/\Sigma_i}/$ ($i=1 \dots M$) of a set collective actors $D_{\Sigma_i}^1$ compose a spectrum

$\theta^4/G^4, \alpha^4 = \{\alpha_{\Sigma_1}^3, \dots, \alpha_{\Sigma_M}^3\}, V^4/$ where each actor has a power P^{4/Σ_i}

An individual actor (or infra-collective) D_{Ap}^0 being part of a collective actor $D_{\Sigma_1}^1$ is called '*pouvoir* actor' (or '*pouvoir*') of $D_{\Sigma_1}^1$ if he is granted or has seized *pouvoir*, defined as the ability to use or steer the power P^{4/Σ_1} of $D_{\Sigma_1}^1$.

The relative situation $\theta^{3/Ap}/G^{3/Ap}, \alpha^{3/Ap}, V^{3/Ap}/$ of a *pouvoir* actor D_{Ap}^0 can be incorporated into a hybrid spectrum

$\theta^4/G^4, \alpha^4 = \{\alpha_{Ap}^3, \alpha_{\Sigma_1}^3, \dots, \alpha_{\Sigma_M}^3\}, V^4/$ where he is endowed with the power P^{4/Σ_1} ,

which highlights divergences and disparities between D_{Ap}^0 and $D_{\Sigma_1}^1$, these divergences being an important factor of insurrectional potential.

4.4 Constructions of powers estimates and aspectual disparities

The power estimated by an observer is an element of the epistemic dimension V_e^1 of his Hyperspace V_H^1 .

This element is described by : $D_{eP}^0/G_{eP}^0, \alpha_{eP}^0, V_{eP}^0/$, where V_{eP}^0 is composed of only one view-aspect Vg_{eP}^0 .

α_{eP}^0 can be split into sub-elements $\{D_{eP_j}^{-1}/G_{eP_j}^{-1}, \alpha_{eP_j}^{-1}, V_{eP_j}^{-1}\}$, where :

each view $V_{eP_j}^{-1}$ is composed of only one view-aspect $Vg_{eP_j}^{-1}$, a set of such view-aspects is composed of:

- a view-aspect for the calculus formula,
- a view-aspects for each factor used in the calculus of power,
- and a view-aspect for the calculated power.

The power views on an observer k observed by an s-observer λ : $V_{eP}^0 \lambda/k \equiv \{Vg_{eP_1}^{-1} \lambda/k, Vg_{eP_2}^{-1} \lambda/k, \dots, Vg_{eP_N}^{-1} \lambda/k\}$ and observed

by an s-observer μ : $V_{eP}^0 \mu/k \equiv \{Vg_{eP_1}^{-1} \mu/k, Vg_{eP_2}^{-1} \mu/k, \dots, Vg_{eP_N}^{-1} \mu/k\}$ may change with selected factors and calculus formulas :

an **aspectual disparity** is defined as this difference between the constructions of this view :

$$\delta_a(V_{eP}^0 \lambda/k, V_{eP}^0 \mu/k) \equiv \delta_a(\{Vg_{eP_1}^{-1} \lambda/k, Vg_{eP_2}^{-1} \lambda/k, \dots, Vg_{eP_N}^{-1} \lambda/k\}, \{Vg_{eP_1}^{-1} \mu/k, Vg_{eP_2}^{-1} \mu/k, \dots, Vg_{eP_N}^{-1} \mu/k\}) .$$

4.5 Synthetic matrix concepts vs SOFT concepts




Figure 8: SOFT concepts vs the evolution of vulnerability, resilience, and positive or negative transformations

1 LAGADEC, Patrick. *Le risque technologique majeur : politique, risque, et processus de développement*. Paris ; New York : Pergamon Press, 1981. Collection Futuribles. ISBN 978-0-08-027058-6.

2 KERVERN, Georges Yves et RUBISE, Patrick. *L'archipel du danger : introduction aux cindyniques*. Paris : Economica, 1991. ISBN 2-7178-2061-2

KERVERN, Georges-Yves. FOCUS : Studying Risks : The Science of Cindynics. *Business Ethics : A European Review*. July 1993, Vol. 2, n° 3, p. 140-142. DOI <https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-8608.1993.tb00034.x>

KERVERN, Georges-Yves. *Latest advances in cindynics*. Paris : Economica, 1994. Gestion poche. ISBN 978-2-7178-2694-4

3 “MRC is the very first method for scientific conceptualization ever proposed”

MUGUR-SCHÄCHTER, Mioara. *The Method of Relativized Conceptualization and its main consequences (MCR 2023)*. 1 July 2023. Available from : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372240792_The_Method_of_Relativized_Conceptualization_and_its_main_consequences

4 *Ibid.*

MUGUR-SCHÄCHTER, Mioara. *Sur le tissage des connaissances*. Paris : Hermes Science Publications, May 2006. ISBN 978-2-7462-1438-5

5 KERVERN, Georges-Yves. *Mise en perspective d'une cindynique géopolitique et d'une cindynique humanitaire* [Archives Nationales]. February 2002.

6 KERVERN, Georges-Yves. *Cindyniques le point décembre 2008 – 20e anniversaire des Cindyniques*. IMdR, December 2008

7 “there is no classical theory of consciousness on the horizon, whereas on the quantum side we at least have a candidate. Even a complex quantum explanation would be simpler than no explanation at all. However, the quantum argument is in fact very simple : consciousness is an aspect of matter at the elementary level (panpsychism)”

WENDT, Alexander. *Quantum mind and social science : unifying physical and social ontology*. Cambridge, United Kingdom ; New York : Cambridge University Press, 2015. ISBN 978-1-107-08254-0.

8 ГУЦ, А. К. СОЦИОЛОГИЯ ОБЩЕСТВЕННОГО МНЕНИЯ В РАМКАХ КВАНТОВОГО ПОВОРОТА (Sociology of public opinion within the framework of quantum turn). *The Scientific Heritage*. Global Science Center LP, 2021, n° 64-4, p. 53-55

9 POPPER, Karl. Models, instruments, and truth. The status of the rationality principle in the social sciences. In : *The myth of the framework : in defence of science and rationality*. London ; New York : Routledge, 1994. ISBN 978-0-415-11320-5

10 Where ‘hyperspace’ simply means that this space has more than three dimension.

11 BOUDON, Raymond. La « rationalité axiologique » : une notion essentielle pour l’analyse des phénomènes normatifs. *Sociologie et sociétés*. Octobre 2002, Vol. 31, n° 1, p. 103-117. DOI [10.7202/001082ar](https://doi.org/10.7202/001082ar)

12 “Frequently the messages have meaning ; that is they refer to or are correlated according to some system with certain physical or conceptual entities. These semantic aspects of communication are irrelevant to the engineering problem.”

SHANNON, C. E. A Mathematical Theory of Communication. *Bell System Technical Journal*. July 1948, Vol. 27, n° 3, p. 379-423. DOI [10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x](https://doi.org/10.1002/j.1538-7305.1948.tb01338.x)

13 FLORIDI, Luciano. *In Defence of the Veridical Nature of Semantic Information*. Rochester, NY, 2007. Available from : <https://papers.ssrn.com/abstract=3907998>

14 Convoi de Barkhane bloqué au Niger : les causes de la mort de 3 manifestants inconnues. Dans : *LEFIGARO*. 18 May 2022. Available from : <https://www.lefigaro.fr/flash-actu/convoi-de-barkhane-bloque-au-niger-les-causes-de-la-mort-de-3-manifestants-inconnues-20220518>

15 CALLON, Michel. Some Elements of a Sociology of Translation : Domestication of the Scallops and the Fishermen of St Brieuc Bay. *The Sociological Review*. May 1984, Vol. 32, n° 1_suppl, p. 196-233. DOI [10.1111/j.1467-954X.1984.tb00113.x](https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-954X.1984.tb00113.x)

16 COHET, Pascal. Turkish Killer Autonomous Weapons Are Used in Africa, UN Report Says. Still no ban on killer robots, ex-Google CEO Eric Schmidt asks Biden to reject the ban. In : *IFREI Cindynics Cookbook*. 19 March 2021. Available from : <https://www.ifrei.org/article58-Turkish-Killer-Autonomous-Weapons-Are-Used-in-Africa-UN-Report-Says>

17 COHET, Pascal. Killer Autonomous Weapons in Africa : Media Delay and Degeneracy. Two or three months later... In : *IFREI Cindynics Cookbook*. 2 June 2021. Available from : <https://www.ifrei.org/article67-Killer-Autonomous-Weapons-in-Africa-Media-Delay-and-Degeneracy>

18 *Thatcher, Hayek & Friedman* | Margaret Thatcher Foundation. Available from : <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/archive/Hayek>

19 *Interview for Sunday Times* | Margaret Thatcher Foundation. May 3, 1981. Available from : <https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104475>

20 “Now, in our real changing world, the situation and, with it, the possibilities, and thus the propensities, change all the time.”

POPPER, Karl. *A world of propensities*. Bristol : Thoemmes, 1990. ISBN 978-1-85506-000-5.

21 POPPER, Karl. Models, instruments, and truth. The status of the rationality principle in the social sciences. In : *The myth of the framework : in defence of science and rationality*. London ; New York : Routledge, 1994. ISBN 978-0-415-11320-5

22 Cf. MRC comment on D1 : “Thereby, from the start, this approach breaks openly and radically with the classical concept of objectivity. It goes up to the extreme limit where it can incorporate as its very source, in a declared way and for systematic use, the supplementary representational element that is necessary for a non-amputated expression of the concept of objectivity in the sense of intersubjective consensus”

MUGUR-SCHÄCHTER, Mioara. *The Method of Relativized Conceptualization and its main consequences* (MCR 2023). 1 july 2023. Available from : https://www.researchgate.net/publication/372240792_The_Method_of_Relativized_Conceptualization_and_its_main_consequences

23 “Les différences entre la définition de la probabilité en calcul des probabilités et son usage par les actuaires ou les spécialistes de l’assurance pour mesurer le caractère vraisemblable ou imminent de l’occurrence d’un événement constitue une zone conceptuelle encore mal décantée. C’est l’analyse en termes de pension qui permet de mieux caractériser la tendance d’une situation à engendrer un événement.”

KERVERN, Georges-Yves. *La théorie de la description appliquée à l’essentiel des cindyniques*. April 2005. Archive available at : <http://web.archive.org/web/20050502081209/http://www.mcxapc.org:80/docs/cerisy/a9-5.htm>

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25 BESAW, Clayton, FRANK, Matthew, KEELS, Eric, BENSON, Jay, FILITZ, John and POWELL, Jonathan. *Annual Risk of Coup Report – 2019*. One Earth Future, 26 April 2019. Archive available at : <https://web.archive.org/web/20200601084636/www.oefresearch.org/publications/annual-risk-coup-report-2019>

26 “the failure to predict the collapse of the Soviet Republic has long been lauded as a failure of political scientists” “More recent work has colloquially labeled expert political opinions equivalent to that of ‘dart throwing chimps’

LAMBERT, Joshua. *Food, Familiarity, and Forecasting : Modeling Coups With Computational Methods*. University of Central Florida, 2020. Available from : <https://stars.library.ucf.edu/etd2020/243>

27 *Ibid.*

28 BESAW, Clayton et POWELL, Jonathan. The coup in Gabon surprised everyone. Why forecasts, and the plot, failed. In : *The Conversation*. 15 January 2019. Available from : <http://theconversation.com/the-coup-in-gabon-sur->

29 “Given the unexpected failed coup in Gabon on January 7th, 2019, quantitative forecasting alone may not capture the full extent to which countries may risk a coup. The analysis of three low-risk African countries highlights that expert knowledge is necessary to bridge the gap between macro-quantitative forecasting and the potential micro-dynamics driving coup risk”

BESAW, Clayton, FRANK, Matthew, KEELS, Eric, BENSON, Jay, FILITZ, John and POWELL, Jonathan. *Annual Risk of Coup Report – 2019*. One Earth Future, 26 April 2019. Archive available at : <https://web.archive.org/web/20200601084636/www.oefresearch.org/publications/annual-risk-coup-report-2019>

30 COHET, Pascal. *Conflictualité et perceptions des puissances durant le putsch de 2019 à Libreville : l’apport des Cindyniques Relativisées*. IFREI, 12 December 2022

31 “En second lieu, Wiener note que les phénomènes qui relèvent en propre des recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques se définissent en fonction de nos propres intérêts : ils se rapportent à la vie, à l’éducation, à la carrière et à la mort d’individus semblables à nous. Par conséquent, les séries statistiques dont on dispose pour étudier un phénomène quelconque, restent toujours trop courtes pour servir de base à une induction légitime. Wiener conclut que l’analyse mathématique, appliquée aux sciences sociales, ne peut fournir que des résultats peu intéressants pour le spécialiste [...] Pourtant, dans un domaine au moins des sciences sociales, les objections de Wiener perdent beaucoup de leur poids. En linguistique, et plus particulièrement en linguistique structurale – surtout envisagée du point de vue de la phonologie il semble que les conditions qu’il pose pour une étude mathématique se trouvent réunies.”

LÉVI-STRAUSS, Claude. *Anthropologie structurale*. Paris : Librairie Plon, 1958

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33 JULLIEN, François. *La propension des choses*. Paris : Seuil, 2003. ISBN 978-2-02-057381-8

JULLIEN, François. *Traité de l’efficacité*. Paris : Grasset, 1996. ISBN 978-2-246-54069-4

JULLIEN, François. *Conférence sur l’efficacité*. 1st ed. Paris : Presses universitaires de France, 2005. Collection Li-belles. ISBN 978-2-13-055143-0.

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36 MAKADJI, Mamadou. Confiance mutuelle entre l’armée malienne et les médias : Un cadre pour aider les FAMA dans “leur guerre d’information et de communication”. In : *Mali Actu*. 19 February 2022. Available from : <https://maliactu.net/confiance-mutuelle-entre-larmee-malienne-et-les-medias-un-cadre-pour-aider-les-fama-dans-leur-guerre-dinformation-et-de-communication/>

37 The term ‘ethnicism’ has not been defined, which is problematic, as it can have two purposes : either to criticize the belief that one ethnic group is superior to another (which is not consistent with the testimonies provided in the Quilès report), or to criticize analysis that take into account or are based on ethnic factors : this critique may come from actors who have no experience of life in Africa, and may therefore be unfamiliar with the real dynamics of many African societies. Therefore, this second meaning does not seem consistent with the expected background of experts in charge of a report on a sensitive African historical issue. That being said, in view of the pivotal (geopolitical and historical) importance of this term in the Duclert report, the fact that it was not defined in this report suggests that this may not be unintentional.

38 COHET, Pascal. Duclert Report : Topological Disparities. The omission of PDD 25. In : *IFREI Cindynics Cookbook*. 6 June 2021. Available from : https://www.ifrei.org/tiki-read_article.php?articleId=74

39 COMTE-SPONVILLE, André. *Le capitalisme est-il moral ?* Paris : Albin Michel, 2009. ISBN 978-2-253-11722-3

40 FOUCAULT, Michel. *Surveiller et punir : naissance de la prison*. Paris : Gallimard, 1993. ISBN 978-2-07-072968-5

- 41 GALPERIN, Eva. Randi Zuckerberg Runs in the Wrong Direction on Pseudonymity Online. In : *Electronic Frontier Foundation*. 2 August 2011. Available from : <https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2011/08/randi-zuckerberg-runs-wrong-direction-pseudonymity>
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61 “*At the international level, the new power must acquire legitimacy. The seizure of power by the RPF was carried out by gun*”

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Vincent Duclert : « Au Rwanda, la France a renforcé la vision du peuple hutu, majoritaire ». In : *France Inter*. 27 March 2021. Available from : <https://www.radiofrance.fr/franceinter/podcasts/l-invite-du-week-end/vincent-duclert-au-rwanda-la-france-a-renforce-la-vision-du-peuple-hutu-majoritaire-5568201>

63 F. Soudan : « *I'm aware that this is a hypothesis, but if the Arusha peace agreement could have been concluded and implemented, with the RPF becoming a political party, with free and fair elections twenty-two months later, do you think it would have been possible for you and your party to have won the elections?*”

P. Kagamé : « *I don't think so. I wouldn't make any assumptions given the circumstances. We weren't known, and so to appear like this on the political landscape and be directly elected doesn't seem very likely to me.*”

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